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SENTENCING BY INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNALS:
A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The post-World War II trials established many important princi-
ples.  Specifically, they  defined crimes against humanity as part of
customary law or of general principles of law, rendered unavailable
certain defenses such as superior orders, and established notions of
criminal participation through the principle of command responsibil-
ity.1  However, the international tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo,
and the successor trials held by various national military tribunals in
the aftermath of World War II, left few sentencing guidelines appli-
cable to cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity.  Despite
contrary procedures before British military tribunals, the interna-
tional and American military tribunals appeared to have no practice
of holding distinct hearings to address matters concerning the sanc-
tion once guilt had been established.2  The tribunals occasionally ap-
pended a perfunctory final paragraph to their judgments reviewing
“mitigating factors” in the rare cases where these were deemed to be
present.3  Thus, there is little precedent to assist courts now that in-
ternational justice has been revived some fifty years later with the
* M.A. (Toronto), LL.D. (Montreal), Professor and Chair, Département des sciences ju-
ridiques, Université du Québec à Montréal.  The author would like to thank Anne-Marie La
Rosa for her comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this text.
1. In re Göring et al., 13 Ann Dig. 203 (1946).  See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY
OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992); ANNETTE WIEVIORKA,  LES
PROCÉS DE NUREMBERG ET DE TOKYO (1996).
2. See United Kingdom v. Eck et al. (“Peleus Trial”), 1 UNITED NATIONS WAR
COMMISSION: LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1, 13-14 (1947) [hereinafter
L.R.T.W.C.]; United Kingdom v. Grumfelt (“Scuttled U-Boats Case”), 1 L.R.T.W.C. 55, 65
(1947); United Kingdom v. Kramer et al. (“Belsen Trial”), 2 L.R.T.W.C. 1, 122-25 (1947).
3. See 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INT’L MIL. TRIBUNAL
524 (1946) (Göring at 527; Keitel at 536; Jodl at 571; Speer at 597; Von Neurath at 582); see
also United States of America v. Pohl et al. (“Pohl Case”), 5 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 193 (1948) (Klemm at 1107; Rothaug at
1156; Oeschey at 1170) [hereinafter T.W.C.].
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creation of the international tribunals for the former Yugoslavia4 and
for Rwanda.5
The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
and the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (collectively “Statutes”) contain brief provisions dealing
with sentencing, proposing essentially that sentences be limited to
imprisonment (thereby tacitly excluding the death penalty, as well as
corporal punishment, imprisonment with hard labor, and fines) and
that they be established taking into account the “general practice” of
the criminal courts in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, as the case
4. The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is an an-
nex to the Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Resolution 808
(1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter Yugo-
slavia Statute], reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993). On the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, see generally VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER’S
GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1995);
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1996); James C. O’Brien, The International Tribu-
nal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT’L
L. 639 (1993); Daphna Shraga & Ralph Zacklin, The International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 360 (1994); Jelena Pejic & Liz Egan, Prosecuting War
Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: The Two Tiers and the Linkage, 1 E. EUR. HUM. RTS. REV.
11 (1996); Alain Pellet, Le Tribunal Criminal International pour l’Ex-Yougoslavie.  Poudre aux
Yeux ou Avancée Décisive?, 98 REV. GEN. DT. INT’L. PUB. 7 (1994); Maria Castillo, La Com-
pétence du Tribunal Pénal pour la Yougoslavie, 98 REV. GEN. DT. INT’L PUB. 61 (1994); Éric
David, Le Tribunal International Pénal pour l’ex-Yougoslavie, 25 REV. BELGE DT. INT’L 565
(1992); Morten Bergsmo, The Establishment of the International Tribunal on War Crimes, 14
HUM. RTS. L.J. 371 (1993); Nicholas Howen, From Nuremberg to the Balkans: The Interna-
tional War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in MONITORING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
EUROPE: COMPARING INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES AND MECHANISMS 261-283 (Arie Bloed
et al. eds., 1993); Roman A. Kolodkin, An Ad Hoc International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F.
381 (1994); Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International
Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 78 (1994); KARINE LESCURE, LE TRIBUNAL PÉNAL INTERNATIONAL
POUR L’EX-YOUGOSLAVIE (1994); Christopher Greenwood, The International Tribunal for
Former Yugoslavia, 69 INT’L AFF. 641 (1993); Jules Deschênes, Toward International Criminal
Justice, 5 CRIM. L.F. 249 (1994); David P. Forsythe, Politics and the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 401 (1994); Pavel Dolenc, A Slovenian Perspective on the
Statute and Rules of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 451
(1994).
5. The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is an annex to Security
Council Resolution 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)
[hereinafter “Rwanda Statute”].  On the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, see gen-
erally Melissa Gordon, Justice on Trial: The Efficacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, 1 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 217 (1995); Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 501
(1996); Roy S. Lee, The Rwanda Tribunal, 9 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 37 (1996); Mark R. von Stern-
berg, A Comparison of the Yugoslavian and Rwandan War Crimes Tribunals: Universal Juris-
diction and the ‘Elementary Dictates of Humanity,’ 22 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 111 (1996).
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may be.6  The Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“Rules”) adopted
by the judges in accordance with the Statutes provide somewhat
more detail, identifying some of the aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors that may be taken into account by the trial court during the sen-
tencing process.7
There is no provision for distinct sentencing hearings and noth-
ing in the Statutes or the Rules would preclude joining merits and
sentencing hearings.8  The conduct of the Trial Chamber in the
Prosecutor v. Tadic hearing suggests that it will proceed otherwise,
holding distinct sentencing hearings subsequent to findings of guilt.9
In some cases, it may be preferable for the parties to elicit evidence
that is apparently relevant only to sentencing during their case in
chief, for example, because of the availability of witnesses.  Although
this may often suit the prosecution, as a general rule the defense will
prefer to wait for conviction before presenting sentencing evidence so
as not to prejudice the outcome on the merits.  For the same reason,
the defense may legitimately challenge efforts by the prosecution to
enter evidence that is germane to sentencing but irrelevant to merits
during the guilt phase of the proceedings.
Somewhat unexpectedly, on May 31, 1996, an individual accused
before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via with war crimes committed against the civilian population in July,
1995 in the Srebrenica area offered to plead guilty to a charge of
crimes against humanity.10  Drazen Erdemovic, by his own admission,
was part of a detachment of the Bosnian Serb army sent to a collec-
tive farm where unarmed Muslim civilians who had surrendered after
the fall of the United Nations “safe area” at Srebrenica were
6. Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 4, art. 24; Rwanda Statute, supra note 5, art. 23.
7. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Viola-
tions of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
Since 1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (1994), amended by U.N. Doc.
IT/32/Rev.1 (1994), amended by U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.2 (1994), amended by U.N. Doc.
IT/32/Rev.3 (1995) [hereinafter Yugoslavia Rules], reprinted in 5 CRIM. L.F. 651, Appendix C,
(1994); International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N.
Doc. ITR/3/Rev.1 (1995) [hereinafter Rwanda Rules]. On the Rules, see generally Daniel D.
Ntanda Nsereko, Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 507 (1994).
8. Rwanda Rules, supra note 7; Yugoslavia Rules, supra note 7.
9. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T (1996).
10. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgment of Trial Chamber I for the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humani-
tarian Law Committed in The Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991, paras. 76-78, Case No. IT-
96-22-T (Nov. 29, 1996).
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brought.11  Erdemovic was part of a firing squad that executed hun-
dreds of these innocent victims.12  A trial chamber of the Tribunal,
presided over by Judge Claude Jorda and composed of Judges Eliza-
beth Odio Benito and Fouad Riad, accepted the guilty plea and, on
November 29, 1996, sentenced Erdemovic to ten years’ imprison-
ment.13  The fifty-eight-page judgment represents by far the most ex-
tensive consideration of sentencing principles by an international
criminal court.  Erdemovic has since filed an appeal which will be re-
considered by the five-member Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal,
headed by Tribunal President Antonio Cassese.
Criminal law has evolved considerably since 1946 when several
of the Nuremberg defendants were sentenced to death and hanged
only weeks later.  The death penalty has now been abolished in a
majority of Member States of the United Nations.14  More generally,
after initial suggestions that it fell within the reserved domain of sov-
ereign states, as protected by Article 2(7) of the Charter of the
United Nations,15 criminal law has become imbued with legal princi-
ples derived from international human rights law that barely existed
in 1945.16  For example, Article 10(3) of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights declares that “[t]he penitentiary system
shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall
be their reformation and social rehabilitation.”17  Yet there is not a
word about reformation and social rehabilitation in the post-World
War II judgments, and their frequent resort to capital punishment is
plainly inconsistent with such an orientation.
This Article addresses some of the issues raised in sentencing of-
fenders before the international tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, including a consideration of the comments and conclu-
sions of the trial chamber’s judgment in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic.  It
is hoped that a practice will develop that takes account of the synergy
between criminal law and human rights law, both of which have
flourished in recent decades, and of the delicate imperatives imposed
by the search for national reconciliation within the context of the
11. See id. para. 77.
12. See id.
13. See id. para. 111.
14. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 347 (1996).
15. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
16. See ROGER S. CLARK, THE UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE PROGRAM (1994).
17. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 10(3), 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 176 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
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struggle against impunity.
II. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTES AND THE
RULES
The Statutes of the two international tribunals are annexed to
decisions of the Security Council.  They are “subsidiary organs” cre-
ated pursuant to Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations.18
Not only are they binding upon all Member States in accordance with
Article 25 of the U.N. Charter,19 they are also definitive of jurisdic-
tion for the judges of the court.20  In fixing sentences, the judges are
therefore called upon to interpret the terms of the Statutes.  Their
objective should be to establish the Security Council’s intent, relying,
where appropriate, upon the various preparatory documents, includ-
ing the Secretary-General’s report21 and the materials submitted to
the Security Council by Member States and non-governmental or-
ganizations, as well as the statements of the permanent representa-
tives during the meetings of the Security Council itself.  Article 24 of
the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia states:
Penalties
1. The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to
imprisonment.  In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial
Chambers shall have recourse to the general practice regarding
prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia.
2. In imposing the sentences, the Trial Chambers should take into
account such factors as the gravity of the offence and the individual
circumstances of the convicted person.
3. In addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chambers may order the
return of any property and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct,
including by means of duress, to their rightful owners.22
18. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, para. 15, U.N. Doc. Case
No. IT-94-1-AR72 (Oct. 2, 1995), reprinted in 7 CRIM. L.F. 51, 59 (1996).
19. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
20. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction of the Trial
Chamber for the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Vio-
lations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in The Territory of Former Yugoslavia since
1991, para. 8, Case No. IT-94-1-T (Aug. 10, 1995); Tadic, supra note 18, para. 14.
21. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolu-
tion 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter Report of the
Secretary General].
22. Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 4, art. 24.
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The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda con-
tains an identical provision, except that the word “Rwanda” replaces
“former Yugoslavia” at the end of paragraph 1.23  Article 28 of the
Yugoslav Statute  (Article 27, in the case of the Rwanda Statute)
states that pardon or commutation may subsequently be accorded,
based upon the “interests of justice and the general principles of
law.”24
The judges of the tribunals have completed the laconic text of
the Statutes with certain provisions in the Rules.  Rule 101 for the
Yugoslav tribunal states:
Penalties
(A) A convicted person may be sentenced to imprisonment for a
term up to and including the remainder of his life.
(B) In determining the sentence, the Trial Chamber shall take into
account the factors mentioned in Article 24(2) of the Statute, as
well as such factors as:
(i) any aggravating circumstances;
(ii) any mitigating circumstances including the substantial co-
operation with the Prosecutor by the convicted person before
or after conviction;
(iii) the general practice regarding prison sentences in the
courts of the former Yugoslavia;
(iv) the extent to which any penalty imposed by a court of any
State on the convicted person for the same act has already
been served, as referred to in Article 10(3) of the Statute.
(C) The Trial Chamber shall indicate whether multiple sentences
shall be served consecutively or concurrently.
(D) The sentence shall be pronounced in public and in the presence
of the convicted person, subject to Sub-rule 102(B).
Credit shall be given to the convicted person for the period, if any,
during which the convicted person was detained in custody pending
his surrender to the Tribunal or pending trial or appeal.25
Rule 101 for the Rwanda tribunal is virtually identical.26  Two
changes have been made to this provision since it was initially
adopted in 1994.  Sub-rule B(iv) originally referred to “the extent to
23. Rwanda Statute, supra note 5, art. 23.
24. Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 4, art. 28; Rwanda Statute, supra note 5, art. 27.
25. Yugoslavia Rules, supra note 7, Rule 101.
26. Rwanda Rules, supra note 7, Rule 101(B)(iii) replaces “former Yugoslavia” with
“Rwanda.”  Id.  Paragraph B(iv) refers to Article 9(3) of the Statute.  Id.
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which any penalty imposed by a national court on the convicted per-
son,” and paragraph E was added.27
Although from a strictly technical standpoint the Security Coun-
cil and the Tribunal may not be bound in law to the terms of modern
human rights instruments, it seems inconceivable that the provisions
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights28 and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)29 are not respected.
In some cases, these are specifically incorporated into the Statutes.
Article 21 of the Statute for the former Yugoslavia (Article 20 of the
Statute for Rwanda) is inspired by the provisions of Article 14 of the
ICCPR, dealing with fair trial guarantees.  The report of the Secre-
tary-General indicates that other international norms should also ap-
ply: “It is axiomatic that the International Tribunal must fully respect
internationally recognized standards regarding the rights of the ac-
cused at all stages of its proceedings.  In the view of the Secretary-
General, such internationally recognized standards are, in particular,
contained in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.”30  But also relevant to the specific issue of sentenc-
ing are Articles 7, 10, and 15 of the ICCPR which state:
Article 7
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be
subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experi-
mentation.31
. . .
Article 10
1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with hu-
manity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human per-
son.
2. (a) Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be
segregated from convicted persons and shall be subject to separate
treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons.
(b) Accused juvenile persons shall be separated from adults and
brought as speedily as possible for adjudication.
3. The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners
27. Yugoslavia Rules, supra note 7, Rule 101.
28. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
29. ICCPR, supra note 17.
30. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 21, para. 106.
31. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 7.
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the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social re-
habilitation. Juvenile offenders shall be segregated from adults and
be accorded treatment appropriate to their age and legal status.32
. . .
Article 15
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of
any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, un-
der national or international law, at the time when it was commit-
ted. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was
applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed.  If,
subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by
law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the offender shall
benefit thereby.
2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of
any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was
committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law
recognized by the community of nations.33
Article 7 encompasses the notion of proportionality in criminal pun-
ishment.  Both Articles 7 and 10, the former implicitly, the latter ex-
plicitly, insist upon the importance of rehabilitation.  Article 15 pro-
hibits retroactive crimes and punishments, stating a rule known by
the maxim nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege.34
III. “GENERAL PRACTICE” IN SENTENCING
The directive in the Statutes that judges of the tribunal have
“recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences”35 in the
former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, as the case may be, appears to be a
response to concerns about the prohibition of retroactive sentences.
This principle is set out in several major human rights instruments,36
32. Id. art. 10.
33. Id. art. 15.
34. This doctrine prevents punishing actions that, at the time committed, were not crimes. See
HANS CORELL ET AL., PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, 68-69 (1993).
35. Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 4, art. 24(1); Rwanda Statute, supra note 5, art. 23(1).
36. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 28, art. 11(2); American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Doc. O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 21,
rev. 6, art. XXVI (1948); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 9, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force Jul. 18, 1978); European Convention of Human Rights, Nov.
4, 1950, art. 7(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, (entered into force Sep. 3, 1953); African Charter of Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights, Jun. 26, 1981, art. 7(2), O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (entered
into force Oct. 21, 1986).
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including Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, and is enshrined in the legal maxim nullum crimen
nulla poena sine lege. This principle “requires that punishments for
criminal acts must be laid down in law when the crime was committed
in order that the Court may mete out the punishment.”37  It has been
suggested that if the international tribunals are guided by existing
sentencing practices in the territory where the crime took place, then
the nulla poena  principle is not offended.38  Such concern about the
issue of retroactivity is difficult to understand given that this question
was supposedly well settled at Nuremberg.  Defendants in the post-
World War II trials systematically argued nullum crimen without any
success.  Perhaps this was because it was widely believed, as the offi-
cial commentary in the Law Reports of the Trials of the War Crimi-
nals  suggests, that “[i]nternational law lays down that a war criminal
may be punished with death whatever crime he may have commit-
ted.”39  Certainly the idea that the nullum crimen argument could suc-
ceed, in spite of a blackletter text, only to stumble because no black-
letter sanction was attached, is paradoxical and even absurd.40  Yet
this is what seems to have happened in the case of the new ad hoc tri-
bunals.
A preoccupation with the nulla poena issue is evident in some of
the early draft statutes for the former Yugoslavia.  Decades earlier,
concerns had emerged about the issue during deliberations of the
General Assembly’s Committee on International Criminal Jurisdic-
tion41 and the International Law Commission.  In 1953, the General
37. CORELL, supra  note 34, at 68-69.
38. See id.
39. 15 L.R.T.W.C. 1, 200 (1949); see also Public Prosecutor v. Klinge, 13 Ann. Dig. 262,
263 (1946).
40. A 1949 judgment of the Netherlands Special Appeals Court was cited by the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: “In so far as the appellant considers pun-
ishment unlawful because his acts, although illegal and criminal, lacked a legal sanction pre-
cisely outlined and previously prescribed, this objection also fails.  The principle that no act is
punishable in virtue of a legal penal provision which had preceded it, aims at creating a guaran-
tee of legal security and individual liberty.  Such legal interests would be endangered if acts as
to which doubts could exist with regard to their deserving punishment were to be considered
punishable after the event.  However, there is nothing absolute in that principle.  Its operation
may be affected by other principles whose recognition concerns equally important interests of
justice.  These latter interests do not permit that extremely serious violations of generally ac-
cepted principles of international law (the criminal character of which was already established
beyond doubt at the time they were committed), should not be considered punishable solely on
the ground that a previous threat of punishment was absent.” Erdemovic, supra note 10, para.
38 (citing Rauter, Special Appeals Court, Netherlands, I.L.R., 12 January 1949, at 542-3).
41. Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. GAOR, 9th
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Assembly Committee resolved “to include in its report an expression
of the view that it would be desirable that the court, in exercising its
power to fix penalties, should take into account the penalties pro-
vided in applicable national law to serve as some guidance for its de-
cision.”42  The same year, special rapporteur J. Spiropoulos, in his re-
port to the International Law Commission, noted the validity of
criticisms by experts and governments that a sentencing provision in
the “Draft Code of Offences Against The Peace and Security of
Mankind”43 did not take into account the nulla poena sine lege princi-
ple.44  In their February, 1993 proposal for an international tribunal,
the three rapporteurs, Hans Corell, Helmut Türk and Gro Hillestad
Thune, acting under the CSCE Moscow Human Dimension Mecha-
nism, wrote:
The sentence nullum crimen sine lege requires that punishments for
criminal acts must be laid down in law when the crime was commit-
ted in order that the Court may mete out this punishment.  As al-
ready explained (Section 8.2) it will be necessary for the Tribunal to
rely on the pertinent national legislation in this respect.
According to the criminal law of the former Socialist Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia the following punishments may be imposed:
capital punishment, imprisonment and fines.
Already in their report on Croatia the Rapporteurs concluded that
it was in their opinion inconceivable that the CSCE should endorse
the death penalty (cf. Section 7.1 of that report).  The draft Con-
vention therefore includes a provision to the effect that the Court
shall not pass a sentence of capital punishment, although this pun-
ishment appears in provisions of the national law (Article 29, para-
graph 2).
Since capital punishment will be excluded, it is necessary to exam-
ine more in detail how imprisonment is imposed according to the
pertinent national law.  It appears that the general rule on impris-
onment (Article 38 of the Penal Code) lays down that imprison-
ment may not be shorter than fifteen days, nor exceed fifteen years.
However, for crimes for which capital punishment is prescribed, the
Court may also impose the punishment of imprisonment for twenty
years.  The question is, therefore, if it is possible to lay down in the
                                                                                                                                     
Session, Supp. no. 12, para. 118, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954).
42. Id.
43. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, in 2 Y.B. INT’L.
L. COMM’N 123, 134-37 para. 59, U.N. Doc. A/1858 (1951).
44. Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Troisième Rapport
de J. Spiropoulos, Rapporteur Spécial, 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 112, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/85
(1954); Summary Records of the 268th Meeting, 1 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 134, 139, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER A/SR.268 (1954).
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Convention the possibility of imposing imprisonment for life.  A
first look at the national law may indicate that this is not possible.
On the other hand, it could be argued that, if capital punishment
cannot be imposed, there would be a possibility of imposing impris-
onment for more than twenty years, n.b. lifetime, according to the
principle maius includit minus.45
It is clear from the Corell-Türk-Thune report that the rapporteurs
were ill at ease with the Nuremberg precedent on retroactive offenses
and punishments.  They drew particular attention to the absence of
sentencing provisions46 in international humanitarian and human
rights treaties such as the Convention for the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide.47 The draft provision proposed by
the rapporteurs stated:
1. The Court shall have the power to impose the penalties provided
for in the Penal Code of the former Yugoslavia.  Such penalties in-
clude:
(a) deprivation of liberty;
(b) fines; and
(c) confiscation of the proceeds of criminal conduct.
2. The Court shall not pass sentence of capital punishment.48
A subsequent Italian proposal manifested the same concern with ret-
roactivity:
Article 7
Penalties
1. For the crimes referred to in Article 4, the Court shall apply the
penalties provided for by the criminal law in force at the time of
commission in the State in whose territory the crime was commit-
ted.
2. If the crime is committed in a place not subject to the sovereignty
of any State, the Court shall apply the penalties provided for by the
criminal law in force at the moment of its commission in the State
born from the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia of which the of-
fender is a national or, subordinately, of which the victim is a na-
45. CORELL, supra note 34, at 68-69.
46.  See id. at 49-53.
47. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for
signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
48. CORELL, supra  note 34, at 111-112.
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tional.
3. In no case, however, may the death penalty be inflicted.49
The accompanying commentary makes clear the preoccupation of the
Italian jurists:
All war crimes and those against humanity provided for under Ar-
ticle 4 are considered international crimes as set forth by interna-
tional law or far-ranging conventions.  However, these international
law sources do not envisage any penalties for such crime; the need
to respect the principle “nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege”, the
basis of fundamental human rights, has induced the Italian Com-
mission to decide in favor of the penalties set forth by the criminal
law of the State of the locus commissi delicti (according to para-
graph 1 of Article 1, reference is inevitably to one of the States re-
sulting from the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia).  If the prin-
ciple is inapplicable (because the crime has been committed in a
place which is not subject to the sovereignty of any State), recourse
shall be made to the principle of active or passive personality in or-
der to determine the law to be enforced.
Nevertheless, the death penalty has been excluded, in line with a
principle that is now part of the European legal heritage, as shown
by Additional Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights.50
The Russian Federation’s proposal, similar to that of Italy’s, was con-
cerned with the same issues:
Article 22. Penalties
1.  Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, for the crimes in article
12 of this Statute, the Court shall designate the penalties estab-
lished under the legislation of the State in which the crime was
committed which was in force at the time the crime was committed.
2.  If a crime has been committed in a place which is not under the
sovereignty of any State, the Court shall designate a penalty pro-
vided for under the legislation of the State of which the perpetrator
is a national or the State of which the victim is a national, which
was in force at the time the crime was committed.
3.  Sentence of death shall not be imposed.  When determining the
penalty, the Court shall take into account any extenuating or ag-
49. Letter Dated 16 February 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United
Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, art. 7, U.N. Doc. S/25300 (1993).
50. Id. at 12 (explanatory notes to art. 7 of the draft statute for an International Tribunal).
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gravating circumstances.51
The Netherlands was also concerned with the question of retroactiv-
ity:
An appropriate sanction norm has to be created both for war
crimes and for crimes against humanity to be applied by the ad hoc
tribunal.  In the opinion of the Netherlands this sanction norm
should be derived from the norms which were applicable under
former Yugoslav national law: the sanctions should not be more se-
vere in principle than those imposed under national norms, in order
to safeguard the nulla poena sine lege principle.52
Other contributors to the debate seemed less traumatized by the
nulla poena issue.  The Committee of French Jurists, with Professor
Alain Pellet as rapporteur, did not appear to be at all troubled with
the matter.53  The Organization of the Islamic Conference, in what
was probably the simplest and perhaps wisest proposal, said:
“Penalties shall be based on ‘general principles’ of law as they exist in
the world’s major legal systems.”54  The United States’s proposal was
similarly succinct and appropriate: “The Trial Court shall have the
power to sentence convicted persons to imprisonment or other ap-
propriate punishment.”55
It is worth recalling Article 15 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which prohibits retroactive offenses and
51. Letter Dated 5 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation
to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, art. 22, U.N. Doc.
S/25537 (1993).
52. Note Verbale Dated 30 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of The Nether-
lands to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, at 5, U.N. Doc.
A/25716 (1993).
53. Letter Dated 10 February 1993 from the Permanent Representative of France to the
United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, paras. 157-59, U.N. Doc.
S/25266. A French scholar associated with one of the members of the expert committee, Karine
Lescure, also warns that a mechanical application of the rule would be both unfair and imprac-
tical.  She said that the rule nulla poena should be applied flexibly, “c’est-à-dire comme im-
posant le respect de la légalité des peines du seul point de vue de leur nature et éventuellement
de leur quantum mais rien au-delà.”  LESCURE, supra note 4, at 120-21.
54. Letter Dated 31 March 1993 from the Representatives of Egypt, the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Turkey to the United Nations Addressed to
the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, at 13, U.N. Doc. A/47/920; U.N. SCOR, Annex, at 3,  U.N.
Doc. S/25512 (1993).
55. Letter Dated 5 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of
America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, Annex 2, at 10,
U.N. Doc. S/25575 (1993).
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punishments but, obviously attune to the issue of war crimes and
crimes against humanity, states: “Nothing in this article shall preju-
dice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission
which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to
the general principles of law recognized by the community of na-
tions.”56  Indeed, the nullum crimen nulla poena principle did not
prejudice the post-World War II trials, and it is troubling to see the
issue return half a century later.  The judgments at Nuremberg and
Tokyo and of the various successor tribunals provide ample authority
for custodial sentences up to and including life imprisonment.57
Some useful guidance in this respect comes from the European
Court of Human Rights which took a less “positivistic” approach to
the nullum crimen nulla poena problem in two judgments issued on
November 22, 1995.58  The rule nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege is
enshrined in Article 7 of the European Convention of Human
Rights.59  The cases before the Strasbourg Court dealt with English
common law and the existence of an offense of spousal rape despite
the absence of any legislated text.60  The accused argued that while it
was open for Parliament to create a new offense of spousal rape, they
could not be condemned for rape of their wives given that the com-
mon law defines rape as non-consensual intercourse with a women
other than one’s wife.61  Endorsing the report of the European Com-
mission on Human Rights, the European Court affirmed that “laws”
as they are meant in the maxim sine lege include unwritten laws, and,
moreover, these laws may be redefined over time by judges in accor-
dance with changing social values.62  The question, said the Court, is
not whether a positive law text enacted by Parliament exists prior to
56. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 15.
57. See Göring, supra note 3; United States et al. v. Araki et al., in R. JOHN PRITCHARD &
SONIA MAGBANUA ZAIDE, 20 THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 47,769-49,858 (1981); United
States of America v. Alstötter et al. (“The Justice Case”) 3 T.W.C. 1 (1948),  6 L.R.T.W.C. 1
(1948), 14 Ann. Dig. 278 (1948).
58. See S.W. v. United Kingdom, 335-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) paras. 35-36 (1995) re-
printed in S.W. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20166/92, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 1, 32-47 (1995);
C.R. v. United Kingdom, 335-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) paras. 33-34 (1995) reprinted in C.R. v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 20190/92, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 1, 30-40 (1995).
59. European Convention of Human Rights, supra note 36, art. 7. Article 7 provides: “No one
shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute
a criminal offence under national or international law at the time it was committed.  Nor shall a heavier
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offense was committed.”
60. See S.W., supra note 58,  21 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 365-73; C.R., supra note 58,  21 Eur. H.R.
Rep. at 365-73.
61. See id. para. 50.
62. See id. paras. 46-48.
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the commission of the offense, but only whether criminal liability was
sufficiently foreseeable and accessible to the accused.63  Significantly,
while the Court addressed the existence of the offense itself, it did
not even consider the appropriate sanction, assuming that if the of-
fense was known, so was the maximum punishment.  The Court said:
From these principles it follows that an offence must be clearly de-
fined in the law.  In its aforementioned judgment [Kokkinakis v.
Greece, Series A, No. 260-A] the Court added that this requirement
is satisfied where the individual can know from the wording of the
relevant provision and, if need be, with the assistance of the courts’
interpretation of it, what acts and omissions will make him crimi-
nally liable.  The Court thus indicated that when speaking of “law”
Article 7 alludes to the very same concept as that to which the
Convention refers elsewhere when using that term, a concept which
comprises written as well as unwritten law and implies qualitative
requirements, notably those of accessibility and foreseeability.
However clearly drafted a legal provision may be, in any system of
law, including criminal law, there is an inevitable element of judicial
interpretation.  There will always be a need for elucidation of
doubtful points and for adaptation to changing circumstances.  In-
deed, in the United Kingdom, as in the other Convention States,
the progressive development of the criminal law through judicial
law-making is a well entrenched and necessary part of legal tradi-
tion.  Article 7 of the Convention cannot be read as outlawing the
gradual clarification of the rules of criminal liability through judicial
interpretation from case to case, provided that the resultant devel-
opment is consistent with the essence of the offence and could rea-
sonably be foreseen.64
Thus, the European Court of Human Rights would have little
difficulty with a sentencing provision relying on general principles of
law or customary law, as was the case at Nuremberg.  Can an accused
seriously argue that since Nuremberg the possibility of a serious
prison sentence for war crimes and crimes against humanity, up to
and including life imprisonment, was not “accessible and foresee-
able”?  It is unfortunate, therefore, that the Security Council implied
63. See id. para. 48.
64. See S.W., supra note 58, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. paras. 35-36; C.R., supra note 58, 21 Eur.
H.R. Rep. paras. 33-34.  The requirements of accessibility and foreseeability have been set out
by the European Court in other judgments, such as: Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) reprinted in App. No. 14307188, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397 (1993); Sunday Times v. United
Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) reprinted in 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245 (1979); Barthold v. Ger-
many, 90 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) reprinted in App. No. 8734/79 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 383 (1985).
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the existence of a problem by requiring the sentencing judges to
“have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences” in
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  The Trial Chambers have no choice but to
apply this provision, which creates a number of difficulties in its ap-
plication.  However, they need not, it is submitted, go beyond what
the Statutes require and insist, as some have proposed, on what
would be a mechanical and ultimately exaggerated application of the
nulla poena principle.
Neither the Statutes nor the Rules suggest a time frame for the
appreciation of “general practice.”  Given the fact that the objective
of the reference to “general practice” seems to be to allay suggestions
of retroactivity, the period under consideration should be that prior
to adoption of the Statute.  In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the
Statute was adopted on May 25, 1993, more than a year after the
break-up of Yugoslavia.  Is it the Statute’s intent to contemplate gen-
eral practice in Yugoslavia before its break-up or general practice in
the successor states?  This distinction could be relevant where the
death penalty is concerned, because it was abolished in Slovenia,
Croatia and Macedonia in 1990 and 1991.65  In the case of the Rwanda
tribunal, whose Statute was adopted on November 8, 1994, there had
been no functioning criminal courts since the outbreak of genocide in
April, 1994, so this is not an issue.66
As in most countries, there are few useful precedents similar to
those cases likely to be heard by the tribunals.  Yugoslavia’s Federal
Penal Code did define distinct infractions for genocide and war
crimes, based on the applicable international conventions, and sub-
ject to imprisonment of not less than five years or by death.67  Ac-
cording to research conducted by students at Duke University, there
have only been two significant trials for genocide in Yugoslavia, one
of Mikhailovic et al. in 1946, and the other of Artukovic in 1986.68  In
65. See Capital Punishment and Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing the Pro-
tection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N.
ESCOR, paras. 19,  U.N. Doc. E/1995/78 (1995).
66. See William A. Schabas, Justice, Democracy and Impunity in Post-Genocide Rwanda:
Seeking Solutions to Impossible Problems, 8 CRIM. L.F. 523 (1997); COLETTE BRAECKMAN,
TERREUR AFRICAINE: BURUNDI, RWANDA, ZAÏRE: LES RACINES DE LA VIOLENCE 319-23
(1996).
67. KRIVICNI ZAKON SOCIJALISTICKE FEDERATIVNE REPUBLIKE JUGOSLAVIJE (1977)
[CRIMINAL CODE OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA], [hereinafter
SFRY CRIMINAL CODE (1977)], SLUZBENI LIST SOCIALISTICKE FEDERATIVNE REPUBLIKE
JUGOSLAVIJE (SFRJ) [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
YUGOSLAVIA (SFRY)], no. 44/1977, ch. XVI.
68. Dylan Cors & Siobhan Fisher, National Law in International Criminal Punishment:
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the former, a majority of the defendants were sentenced to death and
executed; in the latter, the offender was sentenced to death but died
in prison of natural causes.69 Another study, prepared by Ivan Jank-
ovic and Vladan Vasilijevic for the International Tribunal, concludes
that the number of prosecutions for genocide and war crimes “is far
too small to allow for meaningful inferences regarding sentencing
practices.”70  In Rwanda, although various international conventions
dealing with international criminal law were ratified and presidential
decrees were issued,71 there was no direct implementation of them
within the country’s Code Pénal.  Even if the offenses had existed, at
least in name, it is unlikely that the corrupt regime of President
Habyarimana would have tolerated prosecutions for genocide and
similar crimes.72
Although the Trial Chamber would be well-founded in recog-
nizing that there simply is no relevant “general practice,” the provi-
sion in the Statutes must be given an effet utile.  Thus, in the absence
of materials concerning genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity specifically, it may be appropriate to look at sentencing
practices for the underlying crimes of murder, rape, and assault.  In
their thorough study, Jankovic and Vasilijevic note, for example, that
from 1982 to 1990 there were 749 sentences for murder in Yugosla-
via, resulting in twelve death sentences (1.6%), 150 sentences of
twenty years imprisonment (20%), and 227 of ten to fifteen years im-
prisonment (30%).  In Rwanda, such an exercise seems to be impos-
sible.  Upon verification with the country’s Department of Justice, it
appears that no meaningful statistics exist; they were probably never
kept, and if they were, they were destroyed or lost during the 1994
conflict.  In any case, be it in Yugoslavia or Rwanda, basing sentenc-
ing practice on those factors involved in the underlying crimes is
flawed because it fails to take into account the essential and funda-
mental aggravating circumstance, namely that the offenses before the
                                                                                                                                     
Yugoslavia’s Maximum Prison Sentences and the U.N. War Crimes Tribunal, 3 PARKER SCH.
J.E. EUR. L. 367 (1997).
69. Id.
70. IVAN JANKOVIC & VLADAN VASILIJEVIC, SENTENCING POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1994).
71. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra
note 47, was ratified by Rwanda on February 12, 1975: Décret-loi no. 8/75, J.O., 1975, at 230,
reprinted in Codes et Lois du Rwanda, 444 (FILIP REYNTJENS & JAN GORUS EDS., 2d ed., Vol. I
1995).
72. On the culture of impunity in Rwanda under the Habyarimana regime see REPORT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN
RWANDA (1993).
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ad hoc tribunals are indeed crimes against humanity or war crimes.
The tribunals have been created precisely to deal with crimes that are
inherently more serious than the underlying common law offenses
committed in peacetime.  If the crimes are not the same, why should
the sentences be the same?
Even a summary examination of ordinary criminal sentences im-
posed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda shows the futility of
such an exercise.  Quite correctly, sentencing was individualized in
order to take into account all circumstances of the offender and of
the offense.73  An “ordinary” rape simply cannot be compared with
one committed in the types of circumstances likely to be confronted
by the ad hoc tribunals.  Consideration ought also to be given to the
severity of the sentence, taking into account the penitentiary system.
In Rwanda, prison conditions prior to the genocide were gravely infe-
rior to  recognized international standards.74  A five-year sentence in
a Rwandan prison was a dramatically more severe punishment than a
comparable term in, for example, a Scandinavian institution.
Alternatively, the issue of “general practice” can be examined
strictly from the standpoint of the legal texts in force.  Such an ap-
proach does not entirely respect the terms of the Statutes, but it has
the advantage of being straightforward and simple to apply.  The
French-language version of the Statutes is slightly more open to such
an interpretation than the English-language text, referring to
“recours à la grille générale des peines appliquée par les tribunaux de
l’ex-Yougoslavie,” suggesting that the Tribunal is to consider the sen-
tences actually applied rather than those set out in legislation.75  Un-
der Yugoslav federal law, the maximum custodial for grave forms of
homicide was twenty years’ imprisonment.76  Although Yugoslav law
provided for the death penalty, which was imposed seventeen times
from 1982 to 1990, it did not allow for life sentences.77  Life impris-
73. See JANKOVIC, supra note 70, at Table 9; Cors & Fisher, supra note 68.
74. See REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN RWANDA (1993), supra note 72.
75. Is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties applicable, at least by analogy, to
interpretation of a Security Council resolution?  Article 33(4) of the Convention states that
where there are authentic texts in more than one language, and where the traditional rules of
interpretation fail to resolve the issue, “the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having re-
gard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.” Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 33(4), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
76. SFRY CRIMINAL CODE (1977), supra note 67, art. 38 (setting fifteen-year general
maximum for prison terms with the option for a twenty-year sentence under special circum-
stances).
77. Id.
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onment was deemed to be too cruel, indeed, presumably crueler than
a death sentence.  Punishment for rape under the Yugoslav Code was
from one to ten years and, in the case of aggravating circumstances
such as serious bodily harm to the victim, a minimum of three and a
maximum of fifteen years.78  Rwandan law also provides for the death
penalty, although it has not been imposed since 1982.  The Secretary-
General of the United Nations considers states that have not imposed
the death penalty for ten years to be de facto abolitionist;79 conse-
quently, Rwanda appears in the list of abolitionist States.  The
Rwandan Code Pénal also provides for life imprisonment,80 and for a
maximum fixed term of twenty years in cases where life imprison-
ment is not imposed.81  Under Rwandan law, every offender may be
“rehabilitated” after five years if he or she has demonstrated “good
conduct.”82  According to the Code Pénal, the sentence for pre-
meditated murder is death, and for voluntary homicide it is life im-
prisonment.83  The sentence provided for rape is from five to ten
years and may be doubled in cases of “gang rape” or serious bodily
harm to the victim.84
These facts simply confirm what we already know: all societies
provide very heavy penalties for serious crimes against the person,
subject of course to allowance for mitigating and aggravating factors.
The same conclusion is reached whether we look at sentencing prac-
tice or whether we confine ourselves to the legal texts.  These are
nothing more than “general principles of law”, as the term is meant
by Article 38, paragraph 1(c) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice and Article 28 of the Statute of the International
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Article 27 of the Statute for the
Rwanda tribunal).85
The most vexing question when attempting to apply the “general
practice” provision concerns the absence of a life imprisonment sen-
tence in Yugoslav law.  The problem was well-known to the Security
Council when it adopted the Statute, and had been discussed in the
78. See JANKOVIC, supra note 70, at  15.
79. U.N. Doc. E/1995/78, supra note 65, para. 4.
80. REYNTJENS & GORUS, supra note 71, at 383-430, para. 34.
81. Id. para. 35.
82. Id. paras. 141-142.
83. Id. paras. 311-312.
84. Id. paras. 360-361.
85. Rule 89(B) also refers to “general principles of law” for rules of evidence in cases not
otherwise provided for in the Yugoslavia Rules, supra note 7, and the Rwanda Rules, supra
note 7, Rule 89(B).
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comments on the CSCE draft.86  Because the Statute excludes the
death penalty, the maximum available sentence would seem to be
twenty years.87  It has been argued that a life sentence may be im-
posed because it simply replaces the death penalty.  This was stated
expressly by the United States Permanent Representative to the
United Nations at the time the Yugoslav Statute was adopted by the
Security Council.88  It appears that the International Tribunal has al-
ready made up its mind on the subject, because Article 101(A) of the
Rules declares: “[a] convicted person may be sentenced to imprison-
ment for a term up to and including the remainder of his life.”  Cherif
Bassiouni, taking a rigorous view of the nulla poena principle, has
written that this rule may “violate the principles of legality and the
prohibition against ex post facto laws,” and he argues that it should be
amended, presumably to limit sentences to twenty years’ imprison-
ment.89
It is clear that the Yugoslav lawmakers viewed life imprisonment
as a cruel punishment.  They were not alone; other European States
such as Norway, Spain, and Portugal, in the interest of enlightened
penal policy, have also done away with life imprisonment and estab-
lished maximum prison terms of twenty to twenty-five years.90  Dur-
ing discussion of the “Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and
Security of Mankind” in the International Law Commission, many
members expressed reservations about life imprisonment on the
ground that it had been abolished in many countries “as contrary to
certain fundamental principles of human rights.”91  While such sen-
tences may fall short in terms of retribution or “just desserts” for of-
fenders, they are surely more conducive to goals such as rehabilita-
tion and reconciliation.  Would it be a bad thing for the International
Tribunal to follow these progressive guidelines and limit sentences
86. See CORELL, supra note 34, at 69.
87. See Cors & Fisher, supra note 68.
88. Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Two Hundred and Seventeenth
Meeting, U.N. SCOR, at 17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (1993).
89. BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 4, at 701-02.
90. See JEAN PRADEL, DROIT PÉNAL COMPARÉ 576 (1995).
91. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 2 Y.B. INT’L L.
COMM’N 79, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1991/Add.1 (Part 2), A/46/10, para. 88.  See also Sum-
mary Records of the 2208th Meeting, 1 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 9, 10, 12,  U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SR.2208 at para. 10 (Graefrath), para. 21 (Calero Rodriguez) (1991); Summary Rec-
ords of the 2209th Meeting, 1 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 14, 16, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2209, para.
19 (Barboza) (1991); Summary records of the 2210th Meeting, 1 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 19, 26,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2210, para. 47 (Njenga) (1991); Summary Records of the 2212th Meeting,
1 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 53, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2212, para. 4 (Solari Tudela).
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for crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia to a maximum of
twenty years?  This would create an anomaly with respect to the
Rwanda Tribunal, where the same problem does not arise.  Article
21(1) of the Yugoslav Statute states that “[a]ll persons shall be equal
before the International Tribunal” (Article 20(1) for the Rwanda
Statute).92  Although the two tribunals are autonomous, they share
the Appeal Chamber.  Imposing a different sentence on individuals
merely because of the place where the crime was committed is diffi-
cult to reconcile with the notion of equality before the law.93
The solution may well be, as some scholars have suggested, to
treat the issue of “relevant practice” as directive but not binding.
This would enable the Tribunal to impose sentences in excess of
twenty years, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, and to achieve
consistency in sentencing for crimes committed in the former Yugo-
slavia and Rwanda.  According to Virginia Morris and Michael P.
Scharf, “[w]hile the International Tribunal is required to look to the
relevant judicial practice of former Yugoslavia for general guidance,
it is not bound by that practice in the independent exercise of its
functions or in the establishment of its own uniform sentencing
guidelines.”94  Cherif Bassiouni takes a more severe view of the Stat-
ute.  He admits that “use of the term ‘shall have recourse to’ is
somewhat ambiguous,” adding that “[i]t implies that the prison sen-
tences contained in the codes of the former Yugoslav republics are
one source that shall be consulted, but that their provisions are not
necessarily binding on the Tribunal.”95  Thus, both authorities concur
that the Statute can bear the ‘directive but not binding’ interpreta-
tion.  But, Professor Bassiouni argues, “the Tribunal should follow
the law of the former Yugoslavia to satisfy the principles of legal-
ity.”96  Certainly, the Tribunal must respect the nulla poena rule, re-
gardless of the wording of the Statute or the Rules.
Much of the above reasoning appears to have been adopted by
the Trial Chamber in its judgment in Erdemovic.  The three judges
note that the relevant provisions of the law in the former Yugoslavia
in effect at the time of the events offer little guidance, except to sug-
92. Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 4, art. 21(1); Rwanda Statute, supra note 5, art. 20(1).
93. In Canada, the criminal law system is governed by federal jurisdiction, and there are
discrepancies in terms of procedural and sentencing provisions that may vary from province to
province.  The Supreme Court of Canada has not considered that this violates the principle of
equality before the law.  R. v. Turpin [1989], 1 S.C.R. 1296, 69 C.R. (3d) 97; 96 N.R. 115.
94. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 4, at 276.
95. BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 4, at 700.
96. Id.
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gest the obvious, namely that Yugoslav law “reserves its most severe
penalties” for offenses such as crimes against humanity.97  The case
law of the courts of the former Yugoslavia is so sparse that the Trial
Chamber says no significant conclusions may be drawn to assist in
sentencing under the Statute and the Rules.98  As has been demon-
strated above, the travaux préparatoires of the Statute leave no doubt
that the reference to general practice arose because of concerns
about the nulla poena principle.  Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber re-
fuses to apply the provision in the Statute in such a way as to give ef-
fect to the intent of its drafters, as this “would mean not recognising
the criminal nature universally attached to crimes against human-
ity.”99  In conclusion, the Trial Chamber states that:
[R]eference to the general practice regarding prison sentences ap-
plied by the courts of the former Yugoslavia is, in fact, a reflection
of the general principle of law internationally recognised by the
community of nations whereby the most severe penalties may be
imposed for crimes against humanity.  In practice, the reference
means that all the accused who committed their crimes on the terri-
tory of the former Yugoslavia could expect to be held criminally re-
sponsible.  No accused can claim that at the time the crimes were
perpetrated he was unaware of the criminal nature of his acts and
the severity of the penalties sanctioning them.  Whenever possible,
the International Tribunal will review the legal practices of the
former Yugoslavia but will not be bound in any way by those prac-
tices in the penalties it establishes and the sentences it imposes for
the crimes falling within its jurisdiction.100
Thus, the Trial Chamber eschews the highly positivistic view of many
of the Member States, which is supported by some academic com-
mentators, and returns to a more teleological view of the nulla poena
rule that animated the post-World War II trials.  Henceforth, and
subject to the possibility of a contrary ruling by the Appeal Chamber,
technical arguments focusing on discrepancies between the Statute
and the domestic law and practice should be of little assistance to
convicted war criminals.  The Tribunals can satisfy the principle of
legality without having to follow, in a strict sense, the sentencing
practice in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
97. Erdemovic, supra note 10, para. 35.
98. Id. para. 37.
99. Id. para. 38.
100. Id. para. 40.
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IV. MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
The Statute states that when imposing sentences, the Trial
Chamber “should take into account such factors as the gravity of the
offence and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.”101
In another provision, it declares that “[t]he official position of any ac-
cused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a re-
sponsible Government official, shall not . . . mitigate punishment.”102
Nevertheless, “[t]he fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an
order of a Government or of a superior . . . may be considered in
mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia [or Rwanda] determines that justice so requires.”103  The
Rules recall that the Trial Chamber shall take into account the grav-
ity of the offense and the individual circumstances of the offender, as
well as any aggravating circumstances and/or mitigating circum-
stances, “including the substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor by
the convicted person before or after conviction.”104  As the Trial
Chamber notes in Erdemovic, the Statute and the Rules do not re-
quire that all factors enumerated in the relevant provisions be ap-
plied in every case, nor do they limit the Tribunal to factors men-
tioned in these texts.105
The judgments at Nuremberg and Tokyo and of the various na-
tional military tribunals do not as a rule address themselves to aggra-
vating factors.  Given the horror of the crimes over which such tribu-
nals had jurisdiction, discussion of aggravating factors must have
seemed superfluous.  The sole example would appear to be in the
Justice Trial, where defendant Oswald Rothaug was found guilty of
crimes against humanity, and despite the fact that the court found
there to be no mitigating circumstances, it also said there was “no ex-
tenuation” and sentenced him to life imprisonment rather than
death.106  In Erdemovic, the Trial Chamber states that “when crimes
against humanity are involved, the issue of the existence of any ag-
101. Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 4, art. 24 (2); Rwanda Statute, supra note 5, art. 23(2).
102. Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 4, art. 7(2); Rwanda Statute, supra note 5, art. 6(2).
103. Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 4, art. 7(4); Rwanda Statute, supra note 5, art. 6(4).
This provision echoes the text of the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the
Major War Criminals of the European Axis, art. 8, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288 (entered into force
August 8, 1945).
104. Yugoslavia Rules, supra note 7, Rule 101(B)(ii); Rwanda Rules, supra note 7, Rule
101(B)(ii).
105. Erdemovic, supra note 10, para. 43.
106. Alstötter, supra note 57, at 1156, 1201 .
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gravating circumstances does not warrant consideration.”107  The
Chamber supports its view by noting that the Statute makes no refer-
ence to aggravating circumstances, and that such a view is consistent
with the practice of the International Military Tribunal.108  Curiously,
however, the Trial Chamber ignores the very specific and unambigu-
ous reference in the Rules, which state at Rule 101(B)(i) that “[i]n
determining the sentence, the Trial Chamber shall take into ac-
count . . . any aggravating circumstances.”109  It is interesting that the
Rules were adopted by the judges of the Tribunal, and they have
been amended frequently as practice has developed.  However, such
explicit refusal to apply them by three judges of a Trial Chamber
would seem to be unprecedented.
The relevance of mitigating factors is somewhat more obvious,
as the Trial Chamber notes in Erdemovic.  “These have particular
significance for crimes against humanity because of the intrinsic
gravity of the crimes.”110  The post-World War II tribunals also fo-
cused upon mitigating factors when sentencing.  However, there was
no distinct sentencing phase in the Nuremberg trial of the major war
criminals.  The verdicts of guilt or innocence together with the sen-
tences, where applicable, were pronounced at the same time.111  The
International Military Tribunal appears to have presumed that guilt
for the offenses charged was justification for the death penalty, ab-
sent any mitigating factors.  In Göring’s case, the judgment simply
concludes:
There is nothing to be said in mitigation.  For Göring was often, in-
deed almost always, the moving force, second only to his leader.
He was the leading war aggressor, both as political and as military
leader; he was the director of the slave labor program and the crea-
tor of the oppressive program against the Jews and other races, at
home and abroad.  All of these crimes he has frankly admitted.  On
some specific cases there may be conflict of testimony, but in terms
of the broad outline his own admissions are more than sufficiently
wide to be conclusive of his guilt.  His guilt is unique in its enor-
mity.  The record discloses no excuses for this man.112
107. Erdemovic, supra note 10, para. 45.
108. See id.
109. Yugoslavia Rules, supra note 7, Rule 101(B)(i) (emphasis added).
110. Id. para. 46.
111. See Göring, supra note 3, at 524-587.
112. Id. at 527.
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Of course, the full scope of the accused atrocious conduct was re-
viewed in the judgment on the merits, and in this sense aggravating
factors were addressed indirectly.  Often, the sentencing portion of
judgments began, as in Göring’s case, with the simple phrase “there is
nothing to be said in mitigation”113 or, in other cases, with the phrase
“in mitigation”114 followed by a succinct consideration of the relevant
factors.
In the Hostage Case, the American Military Tribunal presented a
rare discussion of relevant mitigating factors:
Throughout the course of this opinion we have had occasion to re-
fer to matters properly to be considered in mitigation of punish-
ment.  The degree of mitigation depends upon many factors in-
cluding the nature of the crime, the age and experience of the
person to whom it applies, the motives for the criminal act, the cir-
cumstances under which the crime was committed, and the provo-
cation, if any, that contributed to its commission.115
The Tribunal also said, “[i]t must be observed, however, that mitiga-
tion of punishment does not in any sense of the word reduce the de-
gree of the crime. It is more a matter of grace than of defense.”116
Following the post-war trials, the United States set up an Advi-
sory Board on Clemency for War Criminals, attached to the High
Commissioner for Germany.  No appellate remedy had been pro-
vided, and this clemency review was seen as somewhat of a substitute.
The Board’s report noted that a few defendants had “the courage and
the character by one means or another to remove themselves” from
appalling assignments, but that “the main impression given, and one
that is most disappointing, is that the majority of the defendants still
seem to feel that what they did was right, in that they were doing it
under orders.”117  The High Commissioner for Germany later an-
nounced several factors that he considered in dealing with requests
for clemency, including “the relatively subordinate authority and re-
sponsibility of the defendants,” the fact that a defendant “had the
113. See, e.g., Göring, supra note 3 (Göring at 527; Keitel at 536; Jodl at 571).  See also
Pohl, supra note 3 (Klemm at 1107; Rothaug at 1156; Oeschey at 1170).
114. Göring, supra note 3,  (Speer at 579; Von Neurath at 582).
115. United States of America v. Wilhelm List et al. (“Hostage Trial”), 11 T.W.C. 757, 1317
(1948).
116. Id.
117. Report of the Advisory Board on Clemency for War Criminals to the United States High
Commissioner for Germany, 15 T.W.C. 1157, 1161 (1948).
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courage to resist criminal orders at personal risk,” and “the acute ill-
ness of the prisoner or other special circumstances of similar na-
ture.”118
During the drafting of the Statute of the International Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, the only contribution to address the issue
of aggravating and mitigating factors in sentencing came from the
Committee of French Jurists.  It urged respect for “[t]he fundamental
principles of proportionality and individualization,” and suggested
that the Tribunal could consider the gravity of the offense (intention,
premeditation, motives and goals of the perpetrator, state of mind,
etc.), the values safeguarded by treating the act as a serious crime
(human dignity, right to life, right to physical and/or moral integrity,
right to own property), the extent of harm caused (either actual or
threatened, number of persons involved, value of property affected),
as well as the personality of the offender, his or her background and
personal situation, and his or her conduct following the offense.119
The United States later made proposals concerning the Rules, and
these appear to have been substantially accepted. “In reaching a sen-
tence, the Trial Chamber shall take into account such factors as the
gravity of the offense, the individual circumstances of the convicted
person, and the evidence submitted during presentencing, such miti-
gating circumstances as meaningful and substantial cooperation pro-
vided to the Prosecutor by the accused, and the extent to which any
penalty imposed by a national court on the same person for the same
act has already been served.”120
The only mitigating factor specifically allowed by the Statutes of
the ad hoc tribunals is that of superior orders.121  Although entitled to
do so by its Statute,122 the Nuremberg Tribunal refused in practice to
admit the argument of superior orders in mitigation.  In Keitel’s case
it said, “[s]uperior orders, even to a soldier, cannot be considered in
118. Statement of the High Commissioner for Germany, 31 January 1951, Upon Announcing
His Final Decisions Concerning Requests for Clemency for War Criminals Convicted at Nurem-
berg, 15 T.W.C. 1176,  1177 (1948).
119. Letter dated 10 February 1993 from the Permanent Representative of France to the
United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, paras. 129-31, U.N. Doc.
S/25266 (1993).
120. Suggestions Made by the Government of the United States of America, Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence for the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Former Yugoslavia,
U.N. Doc. IT/14, para. 26.3, reprinted in 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 4, at 550.
121. Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 4, art. 7(4); Rwanda Statute, supra note 5, art. 6(4).
122. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major the War Criminals of the
European Axis, supra note 103,  art. 8.
SCHABAS FINAL MACRO 12/10/97  4:18 PM
1997] SENTENCING BY INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 487
mitigation where crimes so shocking and extensive have been com-
mitted consciously, ruthlessly, and without military excuse or justifi-
cation.”123  It said the same of Jodl: “Participation in such crimes as
these has never been required of any soldier and he cannot now
shield himself behind a mythical requirement of soldierly obedience
at all costs as his excuse for commission of these crimes.”124  Superior
orders were viewed as a mitigating circumstance by the British Mili-
tary Tribunal in United Kingdom v. Eck (Peleus Trial), and brought a
reduced sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment.125  In an American
case, superior orders were admitted as a mitigating factor where an
accused “exercised no initiative to any marked degree”; he was sen-
tenced to hard labor for five years.126  In the High Command Trial,
Wilhelm von Leeb received the very light sentence of three years in
prison, with the tribunal noting that there was much to be said in
mitigation.  Von Leeb was not a Nazi, and there was no evidence of
criminal orders signed by him.  The United States Military Tribunal
specifically noted that this was a case for application of the excuse of
superior orders not as a defense but as a factor in mitigation of pun-
ishment.127
There may be cases where orders were followed, but only after
being initially resisted.  For this reason, in the Peleus Trial, the ship’s
engineer received life imprisonment rather than death by firing
squad.  According to the official commentary published with the case
report, “the Court probably took into consideration, on the one hand,
that he did, to a certain extent, oppose the order given by the com-
mander to the other accused (not to him), and that, on the other
hand, he had, without being personally ordered, eventually taken part
in the shooting.”128  In the Einsatzgruppen Trial, Gustav Nosske re-
ceived a life sentence, the tribunal noting that on one occasion he op-
posed a superior order involving killing.129  Erwin Schulz also received
a sentence of twenty years. The court pointed out that he was courte-
ous in court, had asked to be relieved of his post, and had protested
an execution order, adding that “it can be said in his behalf that, con-
123. Göring, supra note 3, at 536.
124. Id. at 571.
125. Eck, supra note 2, at 21.
126. United States of America v. Sawada et al., 5 L.R.T.W.C. 1, 7-8 (1948).
127. United States of America v. Von Leeb (“High Command Trial”), 11 T.W.C. 1, 563
(1948).
128. Eck, supra note 2, at 21.
129. United States of America v. Ohlendorf et al. (“Einsatzgruppen Trial”), 4 T.W.C. 1, 558
(1948), 4 L.R.T.W.C. 470, 15 Ann. Dig. 656 (1948).
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fronted with an intolerable situation, he did attempt to do something
about it.”130  Hubert Lanz, a defendant in the Hostage Case, was sen-
tenced to twelve years’ imprisonment with credit for time served in
light of evidence that he had refused or resisted unlawful orders.131
In the Nuremberg Trial, Rosenberg argued that he had objected
to the excesses and atrocities committed by his subordinates.  How-
ever, an unimpressed Tribunal noted that “these excesses continued
and he stayed in office until the end.”132  Frank too argued that he had
objected to Hitler, and the Tribunal accepted the fact that he might
have objected occasionally to certain policies.  The Tribunal also
noted, however, Frank’s involvement in the atrocities.
But it is also true that Frank was a willing and knowing participant
in the use of terrorism in Poland; in the economic exploitation of
Poland in a way which led to the death by starvation of a large
number of people; in the deportation to Germany as slave laborers
of over a million Poles; and in a programme involving the murder
of at least three million Jews.133
Seyss-Inquart, who was responsible for administration of the Neth-
erlands, made similar arguments.  The Tribunal accepted evidence
showing that he opposed some of the more extreme measures and did
not control all of the Nazi activities in the occupied territory, “[b]ut
the fact remains that Seyss-Inquart was a knowing and voluntary par-
ticipant.”134  Von Neurath fared better on this count.  According to
the Nuremberg judgment:
In mitigation it must be remembered that he did intervene with the
Security Police and SD for the release of many of the Czechoslo-
vaks who were arrested on 1 September 1939, and for the release of
students arrested later in the fall.  On 23 September 1941 he was
summoned before Hitler and told that he was not being harsh
enough and that Heydrich was being sent to the Protectorate to
combat the Czechoslovakian resistance groups.  Von Neurath at-
tempted to dissuade Hitler from sending Heydrich, and when he
130. Id. at 519-521.  The sentence was later reduced to fifteen years. Announcement of De-
cisions by the United States High Commissioner for Germany, 31 January 1951, Upon Review of
the Sentences Imposed by Tribunals Established Pursuant to Ordinance No. 7, 15 T.W.C. 1180,
1187 (1948).
131. Wilhelm, supra note 115, at 1312, 1319.
132. Göring, supra note 3, at 541, 544.
133. Id. at 543-44.
134. Id. at 576.
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was not successful offered to resign.  When his resignation was not
accepted he went on leave, on 27 September 1941, and refused to
act as Protector after that date.  His resignation was formally ac-
cepted in August 1943.135
The issue of superior orders involves an assessment of where the
defendant stood within the military or civilian hierarchy.  The lower
the subordinate is found in the hierarchy, the more the excuse of su-
perior orders is likely to be accepted in mitigation of sentence.
Moreover, this is coupled with the notion that resistance to superior
orders by a low-level functionary or soldier would be of no effect,
while a more senior individual might well have influenced the order
by objecting.  The British Military Tribunal imposed relatively light
sentences, such as five years’ imprisonment, on “small people with
very little responsibility” who had been conscripted into service of
the Nazis.136  In the Einsatzgruppen Trial, Felix Ruehl, who belonged
to the Einsatzgruppen for only three months and took no active part
in executive operations, but who was a member of the Gestapo and
the SS, received a sentence of ten years.  The court noted Ruehl’s low
rank, observing that his lack of objection to Nazi atrocities was of no
significance because he would not have been listened to in any case.137
In the Justice Trial, the court cited individual mitigating factors in
rendering custodial sentences less than life imprisonment. In sen-
tencing him to seven years, with credit for time served, the court
noted that Curt Rothenberger had been deceived and abused by his
superiors, and that “he was not sufficiently brutal to satisfy the de-
mands of the hour.”138  As for Ernst Lautz, a German prosecutor, the
court said that “[t]here is much to be said in mitigation of punish-
ment,” including the fact that Lautz had not been active in the Nazi
Party and that he had resisted efforts to influence him.  Lautz was
sentenced to ten years, with credit for time served.139  Even the Nur-
emberg trial of the major war criminals recognized distinctions of this
sort.  In Funk’s case, it stated, “[i]n spite of the fact that he occupied
important official positions, Funk was never a dominant figure in the
various programs in which he participated.  This is a mitigating fact of
135. Id. at 582.
136. Kramer, supra note 2, at 124-25.
137. Ohlendorf, supra note 129, at 581.
138. Alstötter, supra note 57, at 1118, 1200.
139. Id. at 1128, 1200.
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which the Tribunal takes notice.”140  Funk was sentenced to life im-
prisonment but was released from Spandau prison in 1957.141 In the
one case at the Tokyo trial where the Tribunal accepted mitigating
factors, it said that “the military completely controlled Japan while
[Shigemitsu] was Foreign Minister so that it would have required
great resolution for any Japanese to condemn [war crimes].”142
The issue of superior orders was central to the sentencing debate
in Erdemovic.  After considering the fact that the International Mili-
tary Tribunal had not accepted superior orders as a mitigating factor
in the case of the major war criminals, the Trial Chamber notes that
“the rejection by the Nuremberg Tribunal of the defense of superior
orders, raised in order to obtain a reduction of the penalty imposed
on the accused, is explained by their position of superior authority
and that, consequently, the precedent setting value of the judgment
in this respect is diminished for low ranking accused.”143  The Trial
Chamber adds that it is not enough, however, to establish a subordi-
nate position.  The accused must demonstrate that superior orders
did in fact influence his or her behavior: “If the order had no influ-
ence on the unlawful behaviour because the accused was already pre-
pared to carry it out, no such mitigating circumstances can be said to
exist.”144  And citing a United Kingdom military tribunal sitting at the
close of World War II, the Trial Chamber notes “a man who does
things only under threats may well ask for greater mercy than one
who does things con amore.”145  In the specifics of Erdemovic, the
Trial Chamber found insufficient evidence to accept what was really
a form of duress argument,146 although it accepted as relevant the fact
that he had followed orders and held a subordinate position in the
military hierarchy.147
Superior orders is expressly excluded as a defense in the Statutes
140. Göring, supra note 3, at 552.  Telford Taylor writes: “I could not be sorry that anyone
had escaped the gallows, but I saw no basis for Funk’s ‘mitigating facts’ which spared his life.
Certainly Funk’s range of crimes was far wider than Streicher’s, and it was annoying to see
Funk profiting by his own cowardice when others were facing death bravely.” TAYLOR, supra
note 1, at 599.
141. See TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 617.
142. PRITCHARD & ZAIDE, supra note 57, at 49,831- 49,832.
143. Erdemovic, supra note 10, paras. 51, 52-53.
144. Id. para. 53.
145. Id. para. 54.
146. Id. para. 91.
147. Id. paras. 92-95.
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of the ad hoc Tribunals, as it was at Nuremberg.148  In Erdemovic, the
Trial Chamber notes that the provisions in the Statute dealing with
superior orders are “practically identical” to those applicable at Nur-
emberg.149  Other defenses which may be admissible but which are
rejected by the court may be renewed with respect to sentence, as
they are also mitigating factors.  All of the classic justifications and
excuses ought to be considered in this context, including necessity,
duress,150 voluntary intoxication, automatism, insanity and self-
defense.  In the Erdemovic case, the Trial Chamber of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia stated that “in
general, national criminal practice in this respect authorises taking
into consideration any grounds of defence which might have been
rejected as grounds for exculpating the accused.”151  Although reject-
ing the possibility of duress as a defense, the Trial Chamber recog-
nized that it is still germane in the context of sentencing:
On the basis of the case-by-case approach and in light of all the
elements before it, the Trial Chamber is of the view that proof of
the specific circumstances which would fully exonerate the accused
of his responsibility has not been provided.  Thus, the defence of
duress accompanying the superior order will, as the Secretary-
General seems to suggest in his report, be taken into account at the
same time as other factors in the consideration of mitigating cir-
cumstances.152
Command responsibility as a form of criminal participation is
specifically provided for in the Statutes of the two ad hoc tribunals.
It imposes criminal liability on a “superior” where “he or she knew or
had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit
148. Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 4, art. 7(4); Rwanda Statute, supra note 5, art. 6(4).
149. Erdemovic, supra note 10, para. 48.
150. For a case where duress was rejected as a mitigating factor, see United Kingdom v.
Tesch et al. (“Zyklon B Case”), 1 L.R.T.W.C. 93, 102 (1947).
151. Erdemovic, supra note 10, para. 56.
152. Id. para. 20.  The Tribunal acknowledged that the defendant was entitled to choose to
plead guilty, “as established in common law legal systems,” id. para. 13,  but considered that if
the facts disclosed a complete defense, this would “eliminate the mens rea of the offence and
therefore the offence itself,” id. para. 14, thereby invalidating the guilty plea.  Consequently, it
gave summary consideration to the admissibility of a duress defense, but ultimately rejected it
para. 83.  The reference to the Secretary-General’s report is a sentence in the Secretary-
General’s report on the International Tribunal which states that superior orders, although ex-
cluded as a defence, could be considered “in connection with other defences such as coercion
or lack of moral choice.”  Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993), supra note 21, para. 57.
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[violations of the Statute] or had done so and the superior failed to
take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or
to punish the perpetrators thereof.”153  Some of the indictments issued
by the ad hoc tribunals suggest that the principle applies not only to
military commanders, but also to civilians acting in a non-military ca-
pacity.154  In United States of America v. Yamashita, which established
the principle of command responsibility, it was argued that the death
sentence was “disproportionate” to a crime that did not include any
criminal intent, and that was no more than “unintentional ordinary
negligence.”  This plea was rejected.155  However, in Canada v. Meyer
(Abbaye Ardenne case), Kurt Meyer was held responsible on the ba-
sis of the command responsibility principle and was sentenced to
death.  However, the Convening Authority reviewed the sentence
and “commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment” on the
grounds that Meyer’s degree of responsibility did not warrant the ex-
treme penalty.”156
War crimes tribunals have taken into account efforts by an ac-
cused to reduce suffering of the victims.157  At the trial of Waldemar
Von Radetzky, in the Einsatzgruppen Trial, the court stated that “he
did on occasion endeavor to assist potential victims of the Fuehrer
Order and in one particular instance issued passes which allowed
some persons to escape from the camp in which there were being
held.”158  Van Radetzky received a sentence of twenty years.159  In the
Hostage Case, Ernst Dehner received a seven-year sentence, with
credit for time served.  The Tribunal found that he had attempted to
apply the actual rules of warfare, and not Nazi deviations from them.
The Tribunal concluded that, “[s]uch examples of conscientious ef-
forts to comply with correct procedure warrant mitigation of the
153. Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 4, art. 7(3); Rwanda Statute, supra note 5, art. 6(3).
154. The Rule 61 decision in the case of civilian leader Karadzic recognizes the applicabil-
ity of the command responsibility principle, although reference is made to the fact that he was
also the supreme military commander by virtue of his position.  See Prosecutor v. Karadzic and
Mladic, Review of indictment pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Case
No. IT-95-5-R61, IT-95-18-R61, para. 82 (July 11, 1996).
155. United States of America v. Yamashita,  4 L.R.T.W.C. 1, 36-37 (1948).  On the Ya-
mashita case, see A. FRANK REEL, THE CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA 173-74 (1949); Ann
Marie Prévost, Race and War Crimes: The 1945 War Crimes Trial of General Tomoyuki Ya-
mashita, 14 HUM. RTS Q. 303 (1992).
156. Canada v. Meyer (“Abbaye Ardenne Case”),  4 L.R.T.W.C. 97, 109 (1948).
157. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 2, at 124-25 (Ilse Forster).
158. Ohlendorf, supra note 129, at 578.
159. Id.
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punishment.”160  The United States Military Tribunal considered as
mitigating factors the fact that Flick sheltered a conspirator in the at-
tempt to murder Hitler, and that Steinbrinck attempted to respect
the laws of war by rescuing survivors of a sinking ship.161  Albert
Speer received a mitigated sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment at
Nuremberg, principally because:
In mitigation it must be recognized that Speer’s establishment of
blocked industries did keep many laborers in their homes and that
in the closing stages of the war he was one of the few men who had
the courage to tell Hitler that the war was lost and to take steps to
prevent the senseless destruction of production facilities, both in
occupied territories and in Germany.  He carried out his opposition
to Hitler’s scorched earth program in some of the Western coun-
tries and in Germany by deliberately sabotaging it at considerable
personal risk.162
Age or infirmity are among the classic “personal circumstances”
to be taken into account.  In United States of America v. Krupp
(Krupp Trial), several offenders were elderly and in ill health.  The
court expressed concern about the consequences of a prison sentence,
and although it took no specific action, it urged the Military Gover-
nor, who was in charge of supervising the execution of the sentence,
to act accordingly.163  According to United States prosecutor Telford
Taylor, Nuremberg defendant Von Neurath, whose sentence was set
at fifteen years, “undoubtedly benefited by his age.”164  In United
States of America v. Alstötter (Justice Trial), Franz Schlegelberger, a
distinguished German jurist, was in his late seventies and too ill to at-
tend much of his trial.  Although the court described him as a tragic
character, noting that he had resigned his position within the Nazi ju-
dicial hierarchy, it nevertheless sentenced him to life imprisonment.165
There is one reported case of a defendant who was too ill to attend
much of the trial, and for whom a custodial sentence would have
been “equivalent to a death sentence.”166  Erhard Milch, originally
160. Wilhelm, supra note 115, at 1300.
161. United States of America v. Flick et al. (“Flick Trial”), 9 L.R.T.W.C. 1, 29 (1949).
162. Göring, supra note 3, at 579.
163. United States of America v. Krupp von Bohlen et al. (“Krupp Trial”), 10 L.R.T.W.C.
69, 158 (1949).
164. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 599.
165. Alstötter, supra note 57, at 1199-1200.
166. United States of America v. Weizsaecker et al. (“Ministries Case”), 14 T.W.C. 1, 869-
70 (1948).
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sentenced to life imprisonment, had his term reduced to fifteen years
following a recommendation by the Advisory Board on Clemency.
Milch had invoked “instability of temperament due to nervous strain,
aggravated by a head injury.”167  Similarly, in the RuSHA Case, dis-
senting judge Daniel T. O’Connell opposed not only life imprison-
ment for the accused, but also “sentences which in duration carry the
person to an age which, based upon normal life expectancy, is the
equivalent of a life sentence.”168  In Erdemovic, the Trial Chamber
considers in mitigation the relatively young age of the accused
(twenty-three years) and his family status (recent common law mar-
riage, two-year old child).169
The place and conditions of detention should certainly be con-
sidered as mitigating factors in the sentencing determination.  The
Statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal declares that “[i]mprisonment shall
be served in a State designated by the International Tribunal from a
list of States which have indicated to the Security Council their will-
ingness to accept convicted persons.”170  The Secretary-General con-
sidered that “given the nature of the crimes in question and the in-
ternational character of the tribunal, the enforcement of sentences
should take place outside the territory of the former Yugoslavia,”171 a
view which the Trial Chamber in Erdemovic says that it shares.172
The Statute of the Rwanda Tribunal has a similar provision, although
it does expressly contemplate the possibility of detention within
Rwanda.173  At present, however, there is no prison in Rwanda that
even approaches internationally recognized minimum prison condi-
tions.  Short of a major prison construction program in Rwanda, fi-
nanced by international donors, it is unlikely that condemned prison-
ers will be detained in that country.  In the Yugoslav tribunal at the
very least, and probably the Rwanda tribunal, prisoners will therefore
be isolated from their families and probably from other support sys-
167. Announcement of Decisions by the United States High Commissioner for Germany, 31
January 1951, Upon Review of the Sentences Imposed by Tribunals Established Pursuant to Or-
dinance No. 7,  15 T.W.C. 1180, 1181 (1948).
168. United States v. Greifelt et al. (“RuSHA Case”), 5 T.W.C. 1, 169 (1948).
169. Erdemovic, supra note 10, para. 111.
170. Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 4, art. 27.
171. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 21, para. 121.
172. Erdemovic, supra note 10, para. 70.
173. The Rwanda Statute provides: “Imprisonment shall be served in Rwanda or any of the
States on a list of States which have indicated to the Security Council their willingness to accept
convicted persons, as designated by the International Tribunal for Rwanda. Such imprisonment
shall be in accordance with the applicable law of the State concerned, subject to the supervision
of the International Tribunal for Rwanda.” Rwanda Statute, supra note 5, art. 26.
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tems.  They may find themselves in relative isolation, in a culturally
unfamiliar environment, and unable to communicate and socialize
with fellow inmates and prison personnel.  The situation will possibly
be even harsher in the case of protected or segregated prisoners, and
particularly informers, who find themselves set apart even from their
own compatriots and ostracized, even by ordinary prisoners in the
various foreign institutions.  If the place of detention is far from the
former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, it may be difficult to ensure adequate
psychiatric and related services in Serbo-Croat or Kinyarwanda.
Consequently, it seems important that the sentencing tribunal be in a
position to assess certain aspects of the conditions of detention, as
these most definitely bear on the gravity of the sentence.174  In Erde-
movic, the Trial Chamber quite appropriately accords considerable
attention to these matters.  Although it admits that the Statute and
the Rules confer responsibility for aspects of sentence administration
to the Registrar and the President, “[t]he Trial Chamber will, how-
ever, take account of the place and conditions of enforcement of the
sentence in an effort to ensure due process, the proper administration
of justice and equal treatment for convicted persons.”175  In practice,
it was impossible for the Trial Chamber to apply this principle fully
because the Registrar had not yet determined where sentences might
be served.  It did, however, recognize as a mitigating factor in sen-
tencing “the fact that the sentence pronounced will be served in a
prison far from his own country.”176
Although there is no suggestion of this in the Statute, the Rules
specifically provide that “the substantial cooperation with the Prose-
cutor by the convicted person before or after conviction” shall be a
mitigating factor in sentencing.177  According to Morris and Scharf:
The reduction of sentence based on cooperation with the Prosecu-
tor represents a compromise between the judges who favored the
U.S. proposal for granting full or limited testimonial immunity in
exchange for meaningful cooperation with the Prosecutor, and
those who opposed conferring any kind of immunity on the perpe-
trators of the crimes referred to in the Statute as a matter of inter-
national law and policy.  The proposal was intended to encourage
low-level offenders who actually committed the heinous acts to turn
174. See Erdemovic, supra note 10,  paras. 74-75.
175. Id. paras. 69-70.
176. Id. para. 111.
177. Yugoslavia Rules, supra note 7, Rule 101(B)(ii); Rwanda Rules, supra note 7, Rule
101(B)(ii).
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“State’s evidence.”  There were suggestions that it was less impor-
tant to convict and punish the “mere rapist” than it was to convict
and punish the person who gave the orders and established the
policies without which the atrocities would never have been carried
out on such a widespread and massive scale.  Providing for the pos-
sibility of a reduced sentence is intended to provide the necessary
incentive for those who would be inclined to cooperate.  Given the
fact that the alleged perpetrators are faced with the prospect of a
life sentence if convicted, the incentive provided by the possibility
of a reduced sentence should not be underestimated.178
A guilty plea is a form of cooperation with the prosecutor that
should be considered as a mitigating factor.  It spares the prosecution
considerable effort and expense, and may eliminate the need for vic-
tims to undergo the pain and embarrassment of public testimony.  It
is also, of course, a sign of remorse that is germane to sentencing.
The Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia considers that in addition to “substantial co-operation,” it
may, in the same spirit, “take into account that the accused surren-
dered voluntarily to the International Tribunal, confessed, pleaded
guilty, showed sincere and genuine remorse or contrition, and stated
his willingness to supply evidence with probative value against other
individuals for crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Tribunal.”179  The Trial Chamber, however,  adds a condition:
“[I]f this manner of proceeding is beneficial to the administration of
justice, fosters the co-operation of future witnesses, and is consistent
with the requirements of a fair trial.”180  In Erdemovic, the Trial
Chamber did in fact accept as mitigating factors the sincere remorse
of the accused181 and his cooperation with the Office of the Prosecu-
tor.182
Recognition of guilty pleas as a mitigating factor in sentencing
opens the door to “plea bargaining.”  This practice, which is well-
known in common law courts, enables a defendant and prosecutor to
negotiate the sentence in return for a guilty plea.183  The prosecutor
will frequently drop or reduce some of the counts in exchange for a
deal.  Normally, an agreement between prosecutor and defendant
178. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 4, at 279-80.
179. Erdemovic, supra note 10, para. 55.
180. Id.
181. Id. paras. 96-98.
182. Id. paras. 99-101.
183. For justifications of plea bargaining, see Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978);
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
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does not formally bind the court, although judges are generally re-
spectful of such practices and appear to value the contribution they
make to the smooth operation of criminal justice.  If the ad hoc tri-
bunals recognize a guilty plea as a factor in mitigation, this will no
doubt encourage such a practice.  Judge Richard J. Goldstone, for-
mer Prosecutor for the two tribunals, addressed the issue indirectly in
Regulation No. 1 of 1994 (amended May 17, 1995), entitled
“Prosecutor’s Policy on Nolle Prosequi of Accomplices.”  Admitting
that in some cases it may be fitting to negotiate with an accused
where he or she is prepared to cooperate in return for certain advan-
tages, such as immunity, he wrote:
Recognizing that in principle international criminal justice should
operate without the need to grant any concessions to persons who
participated in alleged offences in order to secure their evidence in
the prosecution of others (for example, by refraining from prose-
cuting an accomplice in return for the testimony of the accomplice
against another offender);
But noting that it has long been recognised that in some cases this
course may be appropriate in the interests of justice.184
Judge Goldstone stated that in making such an assessment, account
should be taken of the degree of involvement of the accused and the
relative strengths and weaknesses of prosecution evidence.  He de-
clared that it was “permissible” for the Prosecutor not to indict an ac-
complice in return for cooperation.185  The entire Regulation could be
made to apply to plea bargaining, mutatis mutandis, as the arguments
made and the points raised are equally relevant.
Although plea bargaining offers considerable advantages to both
defense and prosecution, it is not without its flaws.  Plea bargaining
may discredit the integrity of the entire judicial process and, in some
cases, may incite defendants to renounce their rights to full answer
and defense because they are seduced by the advantages of a reduced
prison term.  The problem is particularly acute when the risks to the
accused are great, notably in cases where the prosecution seeks life
imprisonment or death.  Some states in the United States have legis-
lation that actually provides that a guilty plea will entitle the con-
victed person to life imprisonment instead of the death penalty.  The
184. Richard J. Goldstone, Prosecutor’s Policy on Nolle Prosequi of Accomplices, Regulations
No. 1 of 1994 (as amended May 17, 1995), in BASIC DOCUMENTS 135 (1995).
185. Id. at 137.
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constitutionality of such provisions has been upheld by the United
States Supreme Court.186  But the Court cautioned that “[i]f the provi-
sion had no other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of con-
stitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them,
then it would be patently unconstitutional.”187  In a recent communi-
cation presented to the United Nations Human Rights Committee,
the respondent State party argued that plea bargaining was a legiti-
mate technique used by prosecutors in capital cases in order to obtain
guilty pleas.  According to the published views: “The Committee
notes that the author claims that the plea bargaining procedures, by
which capital punishment could be avoided if he were to plead guilty,
further violates his rights under the Covenant.  The Committee finds
this not to be so in the context of the criminal justice system in Penn-
sylvania.”188
V. OBJECTIVES OF SENTENCING
Classical criminal law theory proposes several objectives for
punishment: deterrence, retribution, protection of the public, and re-
habilitation.  Some of these are echoed in the resolutions setting up
the two international tribunals.  For example, referring implicitly to
the notion of deterrence, the Security Council affirmed its conviction
that the work of the two tribunals “will contribute to ensuring that
such violations are halted.”189  The effective prosecution and punish-
ment of offenders is therefore intended to deter others from commit-
ting the same crimes, and perhaps to convince those already engaged
in such behavior that they should stop.  The Security Council also al-
ludes to retribution when it says that the violations must be
“effectively redressed.”190  However, the Statutes themselves are
rather laconic as to the criteria that should guide the judges in estab-
lishing appropriate levels of punishment, and they make no specific
mention of such factors as deterrence, whether general or individual,
or retribution.  They state simply, “In imposing the sentences, the
Trial Chambers should take into account such factors as the gravity
of the offence and the individual circumstances of the convicted per-
186. See United States of America v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570  (1968); Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25 (1970); Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
187. United States of America v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968)
188. Cox v. Canada (no. 539/1993), 15 H.R.L.J. 410, at 416 (1995).
189. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 4, at 1.
190. Id.
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son.”191
In Erdemovic, the Trial Chamber turns to the declarations of Se-
curity Council members at the time Resolution 827 was adopted in
May 1993.  These show, according to the Trial Chamber,
that they saw the International Tribunal as a powerful means for
the rule of law to prevail, as well as to deter the parties to the con-
flict in the former Yugoslavia from perpetrating further crimes or
to discourage them from committing further atrocities.  Further-
more, the declarations of several Security Council Members were
marked by the idea of a penalty as proportionate retribution and
reprobation by the international community of those convicted of
serious violations of international humanitarian law.192
The Trial Chamber continues:
The International Tribunal’s objectives as seen by the Security
Council—i.e. general prevention (or deterrence), reprobation, ret-
ribution (or “just deserts”), as well as collective reconciliation—fit
into the Security  Council’s broader aim of maintaining peace and
security in the former Yugoslavia.  These purposes and functions of
the International Tribunal as set out by the Security Council may
provide guidance in determining the punishment for a crime against
humanity.193
Much of the struggle for international justice, and the battle
against impunity, is a search for truth.  As United States permanent
representative Madeleine Albright told the Security Council at the
time of the adoption of the Statute for the Yugoslav tribunal, in May
1993, “Truth is the cornerstone of the rule of law and it will point to-
wards individuals, not peoples, as perpetrators of war crimes.  And it
is only the truth that can cleanse the ethnic and religious hatreds and
begin the healing process.”194  The eternal contribution of the Nur-
emberg judgment is not so much the individual punishment of the
handful of accused, most of whose names have been long forgotten
191. Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 4, art. 24(2); Rwanda Statute, supra note 5, art. 23(2).
192. Erdemovic, supra note 10, para. 58. The statements are contained in the Provisional
Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand One Hundred and Seventy-Fifth Meeting, U.N. SCOR,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.3175. The Trial Chamber refers specifically to comments by France, Morocco,
Pakistan, United Kingdom, Hungary and New Zealand.
193. Erdemovic, supra note 10, para. 58.
194. Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Two-Hundred and Seventeenth
Meeting, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217, at 12 (1993).
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by all but the experts, but rather in its affirmation of the facts of Nazi
atrocities.  The jurisprudence of Nuremberg and the subsequent na-
tional military tribunals remains the most authoritative argument
against revisionists who attempt to deny the existence of the gas
chambers at Auschwitz and the other horrors of Nazi rule.  Yet, once
the truth is determined and guilt or innocence pronounced, the
court’s work is not completed.  It must also render an individualized
sentence, one that fits the crime.  The precedents set by the post-
World War II tribunals, as well as general principles derived from
comparative criminal law, provide some guidance in this respect.
At Nuremberg and Tokyo, and in the various successor trials of
the national military tribunals, retribution played a major role in fix-
ing sentences, as shown by widespread use of the death penalty.195
The statement by Winston Churchill on October 25, 1941 focused ex-
clusively on retribution as the objective of war crimes prosecutions.196
Yet it is interesting to note the Memorandum of Proposals for the
Prosecution and Punishment of Certain War Criminals and Other Of-
fenders of 1946, drafted by Prosecutor Robert H. Jackson, which ar-
gued:
Punishment of war criminals should be motivated primarily by its
deterrent effect, by the impetus which it gives to improved stan-
dards of international conduct and, if the theory of punishment is
broad enough, by the implicit condemnation of ruthlessness and
unlawful force as instruments of attaining national ends.  The satis-
faction of instincts of revenge and retribution for the sake of retri-
bution are obviously the least sound basis of punishment.  If pun-
ishment is to lead to progress, it must be carried out in a manner
which world opinion will regard as progressive and as consistent
with the fundamental morality of the Allied case.  A purely politi-
cal disposition of the Axis leaders without trial, however disguised,
may be regarded eventually, and probably immediately, as adop-
tion of the methods of the Axis itself.  It will retard progress to-
wards a new concept of international obligations simply because
those who have sought in this war to preserve democracy will have
made their most spectacular dealing with the vanquished a negation
of democratic principles of justice.  They will have adopted meth-
ods repugnant alike to Anglo-American and Continental tradi-
tions.197
195. See discussion at Erdemovic, supra note 10, para. 62.
196. UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 88 (1948).
197. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 14 (1992).
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As the Trial Chamber notes in Erdemovic, retribution was also a
major factor in the death sentence handed down by the Supreme
Court of Israel in the Eichmann case.198  Historically, retribution de-
rives from the lex talionis: “If a man injures his neighbor, what he has
done must be done to him: broken limb for broken limb, eye for eye,
tooth for tooth.  As the injury inflicted, so must be the injury suf-
fered.”199  Retribution is synonymous with vengeance.  Accompanying
the new focus of human rights law upon the battle against impunity,
the significance of retribution as an objective in sentencing is heard
with disconcerting frequency.  Activists whose social vision is nor-
mally pervaded by tolerance and forgiveness become, in the name of
retribution, militant advocates of severe punishment.  It is often said
that society cries out for punishment or justice.  Retributive theorists
argue that if the authorities fail to punish, then individual self-help
will take over, and vigilante action will become the rule.200  But while
it may be important to recognize the danger of such developments,
surely a human rights approach must aim at combating these tenden-
cies in society, which run counter to the rule of law and the protec-
tion of individual rights.  Hannah Arendt, in Eichmann in Jerusalem,
wrote:
We refuse, and consider as barbaric, the propositions that “a great
crime offends nature, so that the very earth cries out for vengeance;
that evil violates a natural harmony which only retribution can re-
store; that a wronged collectivity owes a duty to the moral order to
punish the criminal” (Yosal Rogat).  And yet I think it is undeni-
able that it was precisely on the ground of these long-forgotten
198. Erdemovic, supra note 10, para. 62.
199. Leviticus 24:19-20.  Although the contemporary perception of lex talionis focuses on
its retributive aspect, originally, it represented a progressive development in penology because
of its insistence upon proportional punishments.  Lex talionis was an early expression of the
notion that “the punishment shall fit the crime.”
200. Wallen v. Baptiste (no. 2), 45 W.I.R. 405, 443 (Court of Appeal, Trinidad and Tobago,
July 27th 1994): “When law-abiding citizens reach the point where they perceive that the trials
of perpetrators of the most vicious and inhuman crimes not only take precedence over their
cries for justice but that those perpetrators no longer face their just desserts simply because by
their excessive criminal behavior the system of justice affordable in a particular country can no
longer keep abreast of prescribed or even self-prescribed deadlines then, amidst the platitudes
of the purists and those who perceive capital punishment to be barbaric, the law of the jungle
will one again prevail.” Id. “When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or
unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they ‘deserve’ then there are sown
the seeds of anarchy - of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.” Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart J., concurring).
SCHABAS FINAL MACRO 12/10/97  4:18 PM
502 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 7:461
propositions that Eichmann was brought to justice to begin with,
and that they are, in fact, the supreme justification for the death
penalty.201
In the Security Council, when the Statute of the International Tribu-
nal for Rwanda was being adopted, New Zealand’s representative
Keating stated, “We do not believe that following the principle of ‘an
eye for an eye’ is the path to establishing a civilized society, no matter
how horrendous the crimes the individuals concerned may have
committed.”202  At best, the retributive sentiments of victims and their
families, and of the public in general, must be taken into account in
developing appropriate policies to deal with punishment for gross
human rights abuses.  But their encouragement may have unwanted
and unhappy side effects, particularly where society is concerned with
rebuilding and reconciliation.  It should not be forgotten that many of
the most appalling crimes in both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
were committed in the name of retribution for past grievances.
To the extent it recognizes the legitimacy of retribution, the Se-
curity Council’s reference to “redress” is perhaps unfortunate.  But it
is possible to separate redress from retribution.  For the victims, and
for the public in general, the thirst for justice may be better satisfied
by society’s condemnation of anti-social behavior than by the actual
punishment of the offenders.  What is desired is a judgment, a decla-
ration by society, and the identification and stigmatization of the
perpetrator.  This alone is often sufficient redress.  What is actually
done to the offender as a result of conviction may be far less impor-
tant.  Voluminous examples of the opposite exist where alleged of-
fenders are punished without being judged and condemned.  For ex-
ample, in Rwanda, since the genocide of April-June 1994, tens of
thousands of suspects have been detained in appalling conditions.203
This is surely a form of punishment, but one that gives little satisfac-
tion because it does not result from a trial and judicial determination
of guilt.  Society cries out for justice, but justice is not delivered, only
some ersatz substitute.
201. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM, A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF
EVIL 277 (1994).
202. The Situation Concerning Rwanda: Establishment of an International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Such Violations Committed in the
Territory of Neighboring States,  U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., at 5, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.3453 (1994) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453].
203. BRAECKMAN, supra note 66, at 330-32.
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Punishment is also expected to fulfill an objective of rehabilita-
tion.  This seems to be of great significance in the context of human
rights violations, where reconstruction and reconciliation are para-
mount.  The Security Council resolution creating the Rwanda Tribu-
nal expresses the view that prosecutions will “contribute to the proc-
ess of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance
of peace.”204  That punishment must take this goal into account can
also be discerned with reference to human rights norms.  Article
10(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
states that “[t]he penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of
prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and
social rehabilitation.”  The United Nations Human Rights Commit-
tee, in its second general comment on Article 7 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, has stated that “[n]o peniten-
tiary system should be only retributory; it should essentially seek the
reformation and social rehabilitation of the prisoner.”205  Rehabilita-
tion’s importance in criminal sentencing is also recognized in the
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.206  The
American Convention on Human Rights states: “Punishments con-
sisting of deprivation of liberty shall have as an essential aim the re-
form and social readaptation of the prisoners.”207  In the Document of
the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of
the CSCE, the Participating States undertake to “pay particular at-
tention to the question of alternatives to imprisonment.”208  It may be
difficult or impossible for society to reconcile and rebuild without se-
rious rehabilitation efforts undertaken within the context of effective
action against impunity.209
In the Erdemovic judgment, the Trial Chamber considers inter-
national and national precedents, and in particular examines some
204. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 5, at 1.
205. General Comment 21/44, U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Committee, 47th Sess., para. 10,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.3 (1992).
206. The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc.
E.S.C. Res. 663C(XXIV) (1957); as amended, U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc. E.S.C. Res.
2076(LXII) (1977).  On the Standard Minimum Rules, see ROGER S. CLARK, supra note 16, at
145-79.  The Trial Chamber refers to the Standard Minimum Rules in Erdemovic, supra note
10, para. 74.
207. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 36, art. 5(6).
208. Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the
CSCE, art. 23(2)(ii) (1993).
209. An important effort in this direction has been made by the Government of Rwanda in
its legislation dealing with genocide prosecutions.  See Colette Braeckman, Difficile reconstruc-
tion au Rwanda, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, at 23, July 1996.
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Yugoslav judgments.  Unfortunately, it gives short shrift to human
rights principles, at least in the theoretic portion of its judgment, and
plainly rules out the relevance of rehabilitation as a factor.  Although
it does not deny the possibility of rehabilitation, which would seem to
be serious and genuine in the case of a young and repentant convict
such as Erdemovic, the Trial Chamber says such a concern “must be
subordinate to that of an attempt to stigmatise the most serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law, and in particular an attempt
to preclude their recurrence.”210  For the three members of the Trial
Chamber, deterrence and retribution are decisive in determining a fit
sentence:
It further notes that in the context of gross violations of human
rights which are committed in peace time, but are similar in their
gravity to the crimes within the International Tribunal’s jurisdic-
tion, reprobation (or stigmatisation) is one of the appropriate pur-
poses of punishment.  One of the purposes of punishment for a
crime against humanity lies precisely in stigmatising criminal con-
duct which has infringed a value fundamental not merely to a given
society, but to humanity as a whole.211
. . .
On the basis of the above, the International Tribunal sees public
reprobation and stigmatisation by the international community,
which would thereby express its indignation over heinous crimes
and denounce the perpetrators, as one of the essential functions of
a prison sentence for a crime against humanity.  In addition,
thwarting impunity even to a limited extent would contribute to
appeasement and give the chance to the people who were sorely af-
flicted to mourn those among them who had been unjustly killed.212
Dusen Erdemovic was found guilty of having summarily exe-
cuted anywhere from 10 to 100 innocent, unarmed civilians.  By any
precedent derived from either international or national court prac-
tice, if retribution and deterrence, as well as stigmatization, are pre-
eminent factors, he should be subject to life imprisonment or its
equivalent.  In fact, the Trial Chamber has sentenced him to only ten
years in prison, following the Prosecutor’s recommendation, with
credit to be given for time served.213  The Trial Chamber specifically
210. Erdemovic, supra note 10, para. 66.
211. Id. para. 64.
212. Id. paras. 64-65.
213. Id. para. 111.
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noted “a series of traits characterising a corrigible personality.”214
Thus, despite the theory, the Trial Chamber appears to have imposed
a sentence that is fundamentally clement, that appropriately consid-
ers a host of mitigating factors, and that notably takes into account
the fact that the condemned man is remorseful and a good candidate
for rehabilitation.  The sentence should be a model for criminal law
jurisdictions throughout the world.
VI. AVAILABLE SENTENCES
The recognized principles of punishment, foremost among them
deterrence and retribution, are derived from criminal law, and are
applicable generally, and not just to the context of human rights vio-
lations.  Human rights law has its own contribution to make to the
debate, by its prohibition of punishment which is “cruel, inhuman
and degrading.”215  Although this is a norm which remains subject to a
degree of vagueness and imprecision, and one which is also liable to
evolve over time, clearly punishment which is disproportionate or ar-
bitrary is unacceptable.216  Certain punishments, notably corporal
punishments and the death penalty, are also difficult to reconcile with
the prohibition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment.217  It is
no doubt for this reason that the Security Council, in the statutes of
the two ad hoc tribunals, has excluded all forms of punishment that
violate the offender’s physical integrity, and has specified that pun-
ishment “shall be limited to imprisonment.”218  This represents enor-
mous progress since the Nuremberg tribunal, whose Statute pro-
vided: “The Tribunal shall have the right to impose upon a
Defendant, on conviction, death or such other punishment as shall be
determined by it to be just.”219  Although corporal punishment was
214. Id.
215. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 28, art. 5; International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 17, art. 7; American Convention on Human Rights,
supra note 36, art. 5; African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, supra note 36, art. 5.
216. Among general works on the issue of cruel punishment and torture in international
law, see NIGEL RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1987); Steven Ackerman, Torture and Other Forms of Cruel and Unusual Punishment in Inter-
national Law, 11 VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT’L L. 653 (1978); Barry Klayman, The Definition of
Torture in International Law, 51 TEMPLE L.Q. 449 (1978).
217. The State v. Makwanyane and Mchunu, 16 H.R.L.J. 154 (1995); see also WILLIAM A.
SCHABAS, THE DEATH PENALTY AS CRUEL TREATMENT AND TORTURE: CAPITAL PUN-
ISHMENT CHALLENGED IN THE WORLD’S COURTS (1996).
218. Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 4, art. 24(1); Rwanda Statute, supra note 5, art. 23(1).
219. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, supra note 103, art. 27.
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not imposed either by the International Military Tribunal or the vari-
ous national tribunals,220 capital punishment was applied widely.  In
some cases, prisoners were sentenced to “hard labour,”221 forfeiture
of property,222 and deprivation of civil rights.223  As the Trial Chamber
notes in Erdemovic, any form of punishment other than imprison-
ment “such as a death sentence, forced labour, or fines is excluded”
by the Statute and the Rules of the International Criminal Tribunal.224
Exclusion of the death penalty is a significant benchmark in the
progressive abolition of capital punishment, which has been a theme
of both criminal and human rights law since the end of World War
II.225  In their proposal for an international tribunal, the CSCE rap-
porteurs said, “it was in their opinion inconceivable that the CSCE
should endorse the death penalty.”226  The Committee of French Ju-
rists strongly opposed the death penalty.227  As discussed above, the
commentary on the Italian Proposal states, “the death penalty has
been excluded, in line with a principle that is by now part of the
European legal heritage, as shown by Additional Protocol No. 6 to
the European Convention on Human Rights.”228  In its note verbale,
Canada “strongly oppose[d] the imposition of the death penalty,
notwithstanding that the offence committed may be of a particularly
heinous nature.”229  The Netherlands stated that it “agree[d] with the
other proposals already submitted to the Secretary-General that this
220. “[C]orporal punishment has never been the sentence, or part of the sentence, passed
upon anyone found guilty of offences against international criminal law, and has never ap-
peared among the various types of punishment explicitly made permissible by special war
crimes legislation.” 15 L.R.T.W.C. 200, 200-201.
221. United States of America v. Sawada et al., supra note 126; France v. Becker et al., 7
L.R.T.W.C. 67 (1948); France v. Holstein et al., 8 L.R.T.W.C. 22,26  (1949).
222. Forfeiture of property was declared only in the case of Alfred Krupp.  The High
Commissioner later found that this constituted “discrimination”, and quashed the order:
“General confiscation of property is not a usual element in our judicial system and is generally
repugnant to American concepts of justice.” Announcement of Decisions by the United States
High Commissioner for Germany, 31 January 1951, Upon Review of the Sentences Imposed by
Tribunals Established Pursuant to Ordinance No. 7,  15 T.W.C. 1180, 1188 (1948).
223. Judgments of the Tribunals and Sentences Imposed by the Tribunals, Review of Sen-
tences by the Military Governor and the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 15 T.W.C. 1140,
1141 (1948).
224. Erdemovic, supra note 10, para. 25.
225. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1997).
226. CORELL, supra note 34, at 69.
227. U.N. Doc. S/25266, supra note 53, para. 127(b).
228. U.N. Doc. S/25300, supra note 49, art. 7(1)-(2).
229. Letter dated 13 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United
Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25594 (1993).
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sanction should be ruled out.”230  The United States231 and the Organi-
zation of the Islamic Conference,232 both of which might have been
expected to argue in favor of capital punishment, were silent on the
subject.  This may amount to recognition by them that the current
state of human rights law calls for abolition of the death penalty, de-
spite their own domestic practices, and may come back to haunt them
in future debates about opinio juris, the development of customary
norms, and the notion of “persistent objectors.”  In any case, the ex-
clusion of capital punishment in the Statute of the Yugoslav tribunal
appears to have been uncontroversial.
Rwanda, which by pure chance was one of the elected members
of the Security Council in 1994 when the Statute of the Rwandan tri-
bunal was being adopted, opposed the prohibition on capital punish-
ment, which it still retains in its own domestic legislation for murder.
It claimed there would be a fundamental injustice in exposing crimi-
nals tried by its domestic courts to execution if those tried by the in-
ternational tribunal—presumably the masterminds of the genocide—
would only be subject to life imprisonment.233  “Since it is foreseeable
that the Tribunal will be dealing with suspects who devised, planned
and organized the genocide, these may escape capital punishment
whereas those who simply carried out their plans would be subjected
to the harshness of this sentence,” said Rwanda’s representative to
the Council.  “That situation is not conducive to national reconcilia-
tion in Rwanda.”234  But to counter this argument, the New Zealand
representative stated that “[f]or over three decades the United Na-
tions has been trying progressively to eliminate the death penalty.  It
would be entirely unacceptable and a dreadful step backwards to in-
troduce it here.”235
Rwanda’s own position on the death penalty is far from une-
quivocal.  The death penalty has not been imposed in Rwanda since
the early 1980s,236 and the program of the Rwandan Patriotic Front,
which won military victory in July 1994, calls for its abolition.237  Fur-
230. U.N. Doc. S/25716, supra note 52, at 5.
231. U.N. Doc. A/25575, supra note 55.
232. U.N. Doc. A/47/920, U.N. Doc. S/25512, supra note 54.
233. U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453, supra note 202, at 16.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 5.
236. All death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment by presidential decree on
March 13, 1992. JOURNAL OFFICIEL, at 446,  March 13, 1992.
237. William A. Schabas, Abolition of the Death Penalty in Africa, in SOURCEBOOK ON THE
ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY BOSTON (Schabas ed., 1997).
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thermore, in the 1993 Arusha peace accords, which have constitu-
tional force in Rwanda, the government undertook to ratify the Sec-
ond Optional Protocol to the ICCPR,238 although it has not yet for-
mally taken this step.239  Rwanda is faced with a dilemma.  It seems
unthinkable that the masterminds of the genocide, who will hopefully
be judged by the international tribunal in Arusha, receive detention
sentences, while their subordinates find themselves condemned to
death.  Nevertheless, legislation adopted in August 1996 by the Na-
tional Assembly maintains the death penalty in the case of genocide
and crimes against humanity, at least in the case of organizers and
commanders.240  The Rwandan government could, of course, recog-
nize the unfairness of the situation and carry through with its obliga-
tions, under the Rwandan Patriotic Front program and the Arusha
agreements, to abolish capital punishment.241  Failing such an initia-
tive, it will be left to Rwanda’s judges and to executive clemency to
see that death sentences are not imposed.242  They should be encour-
aged to take such a course, if for no other reason than that modern
sentencing theory and the imperatives of reconciliation require it.
The death penalty is the only sanction that can be justified solely
from the standpoint of retribution.  As for deterrence, the other basic
argument in favor of severe sanctions, modern criminology and juris-
prudence indicate that capital punishment has no demonstrably
greater deterrent effect than lengthy imprisonment.243  But should a
country anxious to rebuild and to reconcile its citizens base its crimi-
238. Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Aimed at Abolition of the Death Penalty, adopted Dec. 29, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/128, (entered
into force July 11, 1991).
239. Protocole d’Accord entre le Gouvernement de la République Rwandaise et le Front
Patriotique Rwandais Portant sur les Questions Diverses et Dispositions Finales Signé à
Arusha, JOURNAL OFFICIEL, Aug. 15, 1993, at 1430, art. 15.  In the Security Council, New
Zealand representative Keating said, “We can only say that our expectation is that in the do-
mestic courts weight must be given to the Arusha human rights commitments.”  U.N. Doc.
S/PV.3453, supra note 202, at 5.
240. See Schabas, supra note 66.
241. See Justice for Some, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 1996, at 32.
242. For an attempt by a European scholar to justify use of the death penalty in post-
genocide Rwanda, see GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE
355 (1995).  In an emotional conclusion to his overview of the Rwandan genocide, Prunier says
that perhaps 100 individuals “have to die.  This is the only ritual through which the killers can
be cleansed of their guilt and the survivors brought back to the community of the living.” Id.
243. U.N. DEP’T OF INT’L ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1962, at
53-57, U.N. Doc. ST/SOA/SD/9; U.N. DEP’T OF INT’L ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT U.N. Doc. ST/SOA/SD/10 (1968), at 55, 115-123; G. Pierce, M. Radelet,
The Role and Consequences of the Death Penalty in American Politics, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 711, 715-16 (1990-91).
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nal law policy on retribution or, to be more accurate, vengeance?
Such a course can only doom Rwanda to new cycles of violence and
brutality.  As Chief Justice Gubbay of the Zimbabwe Supreme Court
stated in a 1993 death penalty case, “retribution has no place in the
scheme of civilized jurisprudence.”244
Life imprisonment is expressly allowed by the Rules, subject to
the argument, as reviewed above, that this may be incompatible with
“general practice” in the former Yugoslavia.  But even if the tribu-
nals determine life imprisonment to be validly authorized by the
Statute, they must consider whether it is an appropriate sentence un-
der the circumstances.  It is submitted that life imprisonment without
possibility of parole or other mitigation of sentence constitutes pun-
ishment which is cruel, inhuman, and degrading.  Walter Tarnopol-
sky, sitting as a member of the Human Rights Committee, stated that
“rigorous imprisonment” of even thirty years could infringe Article 7
of the International Covenant, which prohibits cruel, inhuman and
degrading punishment.245  The Convention on the Rights of the Child
forbids “life imprisonment without possibility of release.”246  Life im-
prisonment without possibility of release effectively excludes the pos-
sibility of rehabilitation which is not only a legitimate goal of sen-
tencing but one which is dictated by human rights law.  It is therefore
necessary to consider whether release is in fact possible once an of-
fender has been sentenced by the tribunals to life imprisonment.
The Statute of the tribunals provides for the possibility of par-
don or commutation, “[i]f, pursuant to the applicable law of the State
in which the convicted person is imprisoned, he or she is eligible for
pardon or commutation of sentence.”247  If the legislation of the de-
taining State does not provide for pardon or commutation, then pre-
sumably the offender has no alternative but to serve the entire term.
There is no provision for conditional release or parole in either the
Statutes or the Rules.248  It might, however, be possible to read this
into the Statute, which provides that imprisonment shall be served in
a State designated by the Tribunal and “shall be in accordance with
244. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General, Zim-
babwe et al., 14 H.R.L.J. 323 (1993); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231 (1976)
(Marshall J., dissenting); Rajendra Prasad v. State of Utter Pradesh,  A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 916, 938.
245. U.N. GAOR, Committee on Civil and Political Rights, para. 6, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SR.142 (1979); see also MANFRED NOWAK, CCPR COMMENTARY 134 (1993).
246. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, U.N. GAOR, Annex,
art. 37(a), G.A. Res. 44/25 (1989) (entered into force Sep. 2, 1990).
247. Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 4, art. 28; Rwanda Statute, supra note 5, art. 27.
248. See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 4, at 710.
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the applicable law of the State concerned, subject to the supervision
of the International Tribunal.”249  Conditional release or parole is
normally an integral part of service of a prison term.  Thus, if the
State’s domestic law provided for partial or full parole in association
with a prison sentence, this might fall within the terms of the Statutes.
Alternatively, the Trial Chamber might provide specifically for pa-
role in issuing a sentencing judgment.  Nevertheless, it seems doubt-
ful that this was the intention of the Security Council, given its spe-
cific reference to pardon or commutation, and there is nothing in the
preparatory materials or the debates to support such a thesis.  Parole
requires an administrative infrastructure, of which there is no sugges-
tion whatsoever in the Statutes.  Pardon or commutation are quite
distinct from parole and conditional release.  The former modify de-
finitively a custodial sentence, whereas the latter simply provide for
its suspension, on the condition that certain terms are respected. In
Erdemovic, the Trial Chamber addresses the issue of execution of
sentences, but makes only an isolated, enigmatic reference to
“measures affecting the enforcement of the sentences, such as the
remission of sentence and provisional release.”250
Pardon implies complete release, whereas commutation is the
substitution of the sentence imposed by the court with a reduced
term or a discharge.  Both are normally totally discretionary execu-
tive acts,251 distinguished from conditional release or parole, which is
often associated with legislated rights that protect the offender.252
The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal had empowered the Control
Council for Germany to reduce or otherwise alter the sentence, but
not to increase its severity,253 and this power was effectively exercised
in some cases. In other cases, however, it did not utilize the ability to
alter sentences, as evidenced by Rudolf Hess serving his entire life
sentence.  According to the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, it shall
first be determined whether an offender is eligible for pardon or
commutation under the applicable law of the State in which the con-
victed person is imprisoned.254  Where this is the case, the President of
249. Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 4, art. 27; Rwanda Statute, supra note 5, art. 26.
250. Erdemovic, supra note 10, para. 73.
251. “La grâce collective ou individuelle est exercée discrétionnairement et pour le bien
général, par le Président de la République.” Codes et lois du Rwanda , supra note 71, art. 124.
252. See PRADEL, supra note 90, at 638-42, 656-57.
253. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, supra note 103, art. 29.
254. Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 4, art. 28; Rwanda Statute, supra note 5, art. 27. Al-
though it seems unlikely that the Tribunal would authorize detention in Saudi Arabia, it is in-
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the Tribunal shall then decide the matter, in consultation with the
judges, on the basis of the interests of justice and the general princi-
ples of law.255  In the case of the Rwanda tribunal, the Rules add that
the President of the Tribunal is to provide “notification to the Gov-
ernment of Rwanda,” suggesting that it may intervene and make
submissions on the matter.256
Morris and Scharf, in their study of the Yugoslav tribunal, have
suggested that it may be inappropriate to contemplate pardon or
commutation for crimes such as those over which the International
Tribunals have subject matter jurisdiction.257  Citing provisions of the
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide258 and
the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949,259 they argue that
“[a]ction that spares the offender from serving the full sentence ini-
tially considered to be commensurate to the crime could be construed
as contrary to the importance attributed to providing effective penal-
ties for the crimes concerned by the international conventions re-
ferred to in the Statute.”260  The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights actually contemplates pardon or commutation, at
least in capital cases: “Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right
to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence.  Amnesty, pardon or
commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all cases.”261
                                                                                                                                     
teresting to note that an offender becomes eligible for a fifty percent reduction in his or her
sentence by learning the Koran by heart.  PRADEL, supra note 90, at 644.
255. Id.
256. Rwanda Rules, supra note 7, Rule 125.
257. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 4, at 306-09.
258. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note
47, art. 5.  Actually, the Genocide Convention does not prohibit pardon or commutation, al-
though it does oblige States parties “to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of geno-
cide.” Id.
259. Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949 For the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3146, 75
U.N.T.S. 31, 63 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 3250, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 116 (entered into force Oct. 21,
1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
129, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3418, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 237 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilians, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3616, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, 387 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).  Again, the Geneva Conventions do not in
any way prohibit pardon or commutation.  They simply require that States parties provide
“effective penal sanctions.”
260. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 4, at 306.
261. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 17, art. 6(4); see also
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 36, art. 4(6) (“Every person condemned to
death shall have the right to apply for amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence, which
may be granted in all cases.  Capital punishment shall not be imposed while such a petition is
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But it is a fact that pardon and commutation have been somewhat
stigmatized in recent years with the new focus of the human rights
movement upon impunity.
The reference to domestic legislation may well create inequality
in treatment of offenders, if they are imprisoned in different States.
Indeed, it seems totally inappropriate to leave the matter to the im-
prisoning State, which “shall notify the International Tribunal”
whether or not such legislation exists.262  The International Tribunal
should review the domestic legislation before determining in which
States sentences are to be served, so as to avoid injustice.  But even
with such review, a State could subsequently alter its domestic legis-
lation, and an offender who was eligible for pardon or commutation
at the time of sentence might not be some years hence.  In general,
the Charter provision is cumbersome and difficult to apply.  In some
legal systems, an executive pardon is always possible.  But does this
mean that any offender is therefore “eligible” for pardon, within the
meaning of the Statutes?
Assuming that offenders are eligible for pardon or commutation,
the President of the Tribunal, in consultation with the judges, is to
review the matter “on the basis of the interests of justice and the
general principles of law.”263  Here, the Rules provide additional de-
tail concerning the criteria to be applied by the President in consulta-
tion with the judges: “In determining whether pardon or commuta-
tion is appropriate, the President shall take into account, inter alia,
the gravity of the crime or crimes for which the prisoner was con-
victed, the treatment of similarly-situated prisoners, the prisoner’s
demonstration of rehabilitation, as well as any substantial coopera-
tion of the prisoner with the Prosecutor.”264  Use of the terms
“interests of justice” and “general principles of law” provide the
President of the Tribunal with enormous discretion, although there is
some legal authority to assist in interpreting the latter phrase.
“General principles of law recognized by civilized nations” is one of
the three principal sources of international law recognized in Article
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and the
scope of the term has been interpreted on several occasions by the
Court.265
                                                                                                                                     
pending decision by the competent authority”); Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the
Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, ESCOR, art. 7, E.S.C. Res. 1984/50 (1984).
262. Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 4, art. 28; Rwanda Statute, supra note 5, art. 27.
263. Id.
264. Yugoslavia Rules, supra note 7, Rule 125; Rwanda Rules, supra note 7, Rule 125.
265. See, e.g., Effect of Awards of Compensation made by the  United Nations Administra-
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It seems impossible to affirm with any certitude that there exists
a right of release, in appropriate cases, following a sentence of life
imprisonment.  There is no assurance that release will be allowed by
the domestic legislation of the detaining State, and there is the dan-
ger that even if it exists now it may be withdrawn subsequently.  The
system seems uncomfortably similar to that in effect in the United
Kingdom in the case of juvenile offenders sentenced to indefinite
terms “at Her Majesty’s Pleasure.”  The absence of any statutory
right of review of such sentences led the European Court of Human
Rights, in its judgment of February 21, 1996, to find the United King-
dom in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights.266
The Statutes also provide that in addition to imprisonment, “the
Trial Chambers may order the return of any property and proceeds
acquired by criminal conduct, including by means of duress, to their
rightful owners.”267  The Security Council had, prior to adoption of
the Statute of the Yugoslav tribunal, endorsed the principle that all
statements or commitments made under duress, particularly those
relating to land and property, are wholly null and void.268  The post-
World War II tribunals were also empowered to order confiscation of
stolen property and its return to the legitimate owners.269
The United States delegation, in its comments on the Yugoslav
Statute before the Security Council, stated that “with respect to Arti-
cle 24, it is our understanding that compensation to victims by a con-
victed person may be an appropriate part of decisions on sentenc-
ing.”270  It seems hard to reconcile this comment with the text of
Article 24 (Article 23 of the Rwanda Statute).271  The Statute also ap-
pears to exclude the possibility of fines.  This had been proposed in
the CSCE draft.272  The report of the Secretary-General confirms the
fact that fines are excluded when it suggests that confiscation of
property is possible “[i]n addition to imprisonment.”273  Nevertheless,
                                                                                                                                     
tive Tribunal Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 53; Case Concerning Delimitation of the Mari-
time Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v. United States), 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 246,
paras. 129-148; Chorzow Factory Case, 1928 P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 17, at 29.
266. Hussain v. United Kingdom, February 21, 1996, unreported; Singh v. United Kingdom,
February 21, 1996, unreported.
267. Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 4, art. 24(3); Rwanda Statute, supra note 5, art. 23(3).
268. S.C. Res. 779, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., S/RES/779 (1992).
269. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, supra note 103, art. 28.
270. U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217, supra note 194, at 17.
271. Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 4, art. 24; Rwanda Statute, supra note 5, art. 23.
272. CORELL, supra note 34, art. 29(1)(b), at 111.
273. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 21, para. 114.
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the judges have provided for fines in the case of offenses that they
themselves have created as part of the Rules, in the case of contempt
of the tribunal and false testimony under solemn declaration.274
No civil consequences of a judgment by the tribunals are pro-
vided for.  In the case of the former Yugoslavia, these do exist by vir-
tue of the Dayton Agreement.  The Constitution of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (Annex IV of the Dayton Agreement) states: “No per-
son who is serving a sentence imposed by the International Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia . . . may stand as a candidate or hold any
appointive, elective, or other public office in the territory of Bosnia
and Herzegovina.”275  There is a similar provision concerning the
Commission to Preserve National Monuments.276
VII. CONCLUSION
The establishment of the ad hoc international tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda draws upon three distinct but related
areas of law: international criminal law, international humanitarian
law and international human rights law.  It is the presence of this
third area that sets it apart from its predecessors.  An early effort at
international justice, proposed in the 1919 Versailles Treaty but
never effectively implemented, was concerned essentially with pun-
ishing individual leaders for their responsibility in breaches of inter-
national treaties by sovereign states.277  International human rights
law was in its infancy when the allies planned the Nuremberg Tribu-
nal in August 1945, and to the extent that human rights abuses were
punished, this was only on the condition that they were related, as
crimes against humanity, to the armed conflict.  Lest we forget, this
seminal experiment in justice for humanity was entitled the
“international military tribunal.”278  Thus, until the 1990s, interna-
274. Yugoslavia Rules, supra note 7, Rule 77(A), Rule 91(E); Rwanda Rules, supra note 7,
Rule 77(A), Rule 91(E).
275. Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia-Yugoslavia: General Framework Agreement for
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, 35 I.L.M. 75, 118, 125 Annex IV art. IX § 1
(1996).
276. Agreement on Commission to Preserve National Monuments, 35 I.L.M. 75, 142 Annex
8, art. II (1996).
277. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers (Treaty of Versailles),
June 28, 1919, arts. 127-130, 225 C.S.T. 188, 285  T.S. 4, arts. 228-230.
278. Obviously, I am not in agreement with a recent statement in a ruling of one of the
Trial Chambers: “The International Tribunal is, in certain respects, comparable to a military
tribunal, which often has limited rights of due process and more lenient rules of evidence.”
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for
Victims and Witnesses, Case No. IT-94-1-T, para. 28 (Aug. 10, 1995), reprinted in 7 CRIM. L.
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tional justice addressed primarily the laws of armed conflict.  Yet it
was because of the danger of legitimizing armed conflict that the
United Nations originally chose to remain aloof from the field of in-
ternational humanitarian law.  War was outlawed by the Charter, and
an area of law whose purpose was only to regulate the waging of war
could hardly be compatible with the organization’s aims.
Our new models eschew the nexus with illegal war.  They do not
even include a category of “crimes against peace,” one of the three
categories of infraction for which offenders were tried at Nuremberg.
Moreover, they muddle the classic dichotomy between international
and non-international armed conflict, a distinction rooted in the spe-
cifics of humanitarian law but one which is irrelevant from a human
rights standpoint.  Nor are the new tribunals created by treaty, as in
the past, but rather by decision of a rejuvenated Security Council that
now considers abuses of human rights within the borders of sovereign
states to be matters that concern international peace and security and
that compel its intervention.279  To be sure, the Yugoslav and Rwan-
dan tribunals bear the imprimatur of their legal predecessors, notably
in the somewhat anachronistic catalog of infractions.  Indisputably,
however, the new courts are fundamentally interested in massive
violations of human rights which we continue to label violations of
the laws and customs of war, or grave breaches of the humanitarian
law conventions, or crimes against humanity, out of concern for the
nullum crimen principle.
An appreciation of this new and original perspective on interna-
tional justice is important from a number of standpoints, among them
the issue of punishment.  To date, little attention has been given to
sentencing per se.  This may be partially explained by the fact that
human rights activists are ill at ease with punishment.  It is only in re-
cent years, with the new focus on impunity as a human rights viola-
tion in and of itself,280 that the human rights community has adjusted
its historic predisposition for the rights of the defense and the protec-
tion of prisoners to a more prosecution-based orientation.  For ex-
                                                                                                                                     
FORUM 139 (1996).
279. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc.  S/RES/688 (1991); see also
Kelly Kate Pease & David P. Forsythe, Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention, and World
Politics, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 290 (1993); Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein, L’Assistance Humanitaire
Face à la Souveraineté des États, 3  REV. TRIM. DR. H. 343 (1992); Payam Akhavan, Lessons
from Iraqi Kurdistan: Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention Against Genocide, 11
NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 41 (1993).
280. See, e.g., IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
(Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995).
SCHABAS FINAL MACRO 12/10/97  4:18 PM
516 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 7:461
ample, the international non-governmental organization Amnesty In-
ternational, whose traditional concern has been with prisoners and
with the mitigation of punishment, is now one of the most aggressive
advocates of international criminal justice and an enthusiastic sup-
porter of the work of the ad hoc tribunals.  This change in the empha-
sis of Amnesty International is perhaps no better demonstrated by
the fact that it recently took a formal position opposed to amnes-
ties.281
The lessons of history must be repeated for future generations in
order to help prevent the political consequences of the crimes that
were associated with undemocratic regimes, and to ensure that those
who seek to return to the past remain pariahs of the body politic.
Historical revisionism and negationism must be combated.  The de-
claratory value of criminal law is probably its most important contri-
bution to the struggle against impunity.  Society declares that certain
specific kinds of behavior are wrong and anti-social.  This process
takes place publicly, and its conclusions add to the collective mem-
ory.  To the extent the victims seek retribution, if only as a form of
emotional catharsis, they are given at least partial satisfaction in the
form of truth.  In international justice, the finding of guilt will be far
more important than the actual sentence which is meted out.
The elimination of the death penalty is already an important step
away from retributive punishment.  Although the ad hoc Tribunals
are probably entitled to impose sentences of life imprisonment with-
out violating the nulla poena sine lege principle, serious thought
should be given to the wisdom of such a course, except in the rare
cases where offenders are so disturbed that protection of the public
against recidivism overrides all other sentencing considerations.  As a
general rule, they should never lose sight of rehabilitation, conscious
of its close relationship to the social imperative of reconciliation in a
war-torn country.  If parole or some other form of release cannot be
assured, then life sentences should not even be considered.
As human rights tribunals, the ad hoc tribunals should be aware
that they are mandated to provide a model of enlightened justice.
Judges around the world, sitting in the most mundane criminal cases,
will be influenced by their approaches to criminal law.  Wrong or
even confusing signals from The Hague and Arusha may set human
rights back decades, within the context of criminal justice.  That the
281. Amnesty International, Policy Statement on Impunity, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE:
HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES, Vol. 1, 219-221 (Neil
Kritz ed., 1995).
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judges of the International Criminal Tribunals understand the impor-
tance of their mission when questions of procedural fairness or condi-
tions of preventive detention are concerned now seems to be beyond
question.  The judgment of the Trial Chamber in Erdemovic shows
that they are animated by the same progressive philosophy in matters
of sentencing.
